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Abstract 
This thesis provides an alternative explanation to existing constructivist accounts of the 
OECD campaign against tax havens.  It reinterprets the OECD project through a 
neoliberal institutionalist lens and offers a different take on each major historical 
development.  It brings the narrative up to date, describing the events of the past two 
years and explaining the underlying causes in a manner consistent with the neoliberal 
reinterpretation.  It finishes by considering what this account might predict for the 
future of tax information exchange.  The thesis finds that transformative change 
happens in accordance with state interests rather than with identities and norms.  
International institutions fundamentally exist to advance the interests of their member-
states and will adapt their goals to reflect changing collective interests.  States that are 
coerced to change their behaviour can be expected to comply only to the extent required 
to avoid sanctions. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
Since publication of its seminal report Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global 
Issue in 1998, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
has been recognisably at the centre of an international campaign against tax havens.  
This movement began amidst a series of monetary crises in the early-mid 1990s which 
were aggravated by the swift actions of investors in withdrawing and/or injecting 
capital.1  In this context, tax havens were seen to facilitate the movement of capital 
offshore and to undermine the ability of governments in capital-rich states to tax the 
proceeds.  The concept of an international ‘race-to-the-bottom’ in corporate tax rates 
emerged, as tax havens were seen to compete for capital by undercutting the tax rates of 
other countries.  There was (and to some extent continues to be) a fear that unless tax 
rates and corresponding social services were cut to competitive levels by governments, 
capital that underwrote state economies would be lost.  Neither of these options was 
attractive to governments and the decision was further complicated by its nature as a 
prisoner’s dilemma, because any individual state’s movement of its tax rates could lead 
to exploitation by investors or by other states.2 
 
The OECD was directed to initiate the project on Harmful Tax Competition by the 
Group of Seven (G7) in 1996.3   “Harmful competition” was defined broadly by the 
1998 report as including both preferential regimes (special concessions for foreign 
entities) and the practices of tax havens.  Tax havens were states with no or low taxation 
that offered or were perceived to offer themselves as places where non-residents could 
escape tax in their country of residence.   In addition, tax havens had no substantive 
activity, a lack of information exchange and a lack of transparency.4 
 
The campaign gained momentum in June 2000 with the publication of the OECD’s 
Towards Global Tax Cooperation: Progress In Identifying And Eliminating Harmful 
                                                 
1
 Hampton, Mark P., and Jason P. Abbott. ‘The Rise (and Fall?) of Offshore Finance in the Global 
Economy: Editors’ Introduction’, in Mark P. Hampton and Jason P. Abbott (eds.), Offshore Finance 
Centres and Tax Havens: The Rise of Global Capital, (Ichor Business Books: Indiana, 1999), p 2. 
2
 Sharman, J.C. ‘Norms, coercion and contracting in the struggle against 'harmful' tax’ competition, 
Australian Journal of International Affairs Vol. 60, No. 1, pp. 143_/169, March 2006, p 146. 
3Ibid, p 145. 
4
 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Centre for Tax Policy and Administration. 
Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue, 1998. 
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Tax Practices (hereafter referred to as the 2000 Progress Report), containing a now 
infamous ‘blacklist’ of jurisdictions meeting the criteria for a tax haven.  The blacklisted 
countries were given a deadline of 31 July 2001 by which time they were to have 
committed to removing their harmful tax practices by 31 December 2005.5   Any tax 
havens that failed to make this commitment would be published in a new list of 
“uncooperative tax havens” and this would be the basis for imposing “defensive 
measures” (i.e. sanctions).  The report provided a lengthy list of potential measures 
including additional taxation, targeting for audit, refusal to negotiate or apply bilateral 
tax agreements, punitive transactional charges and denial of non-essential economic 
aid. 6   Such measures could be applied unilaterally according to individual state 
discretion, and coordination of such measures would be considered across the OECD.   
The blacklisted states responded rapidly, with six making commitments prior to the 
report’s publication in exchange for being excluded from the original list, and a further 
five committing in exchange for subsequent removal from the list.7 
 
At this time, constructivist explanations began to account for the effectiveness of the 
blacklist.  Blacklisting was a “speech act” which changed the reputation of states by 
virtue of the list’s publication.  The damage that blacklisting caused to states’ 
reputations resonated among investors, thus producing pressure to comply through 
actual or anticipated capital flight.8   States responded to the blacklist and chose to 
cooperate with the OECD even without sanctions and at great cost to their economies. 
 
Despite this rapid initial success, in the following OECD Progress Report of November 
2001 (the 2001 Progress Report), the project was vastly scaled back.  The first two 
elements considered essential to tax havens – no or low taxation and no substantive 
activities – would no longer be pursued by the project.   Instead, commitments would be 
sought only in respect of transparency and exchange of information, and the 31 July 
2001 deadline (which had passed without mention) was extended to 28 February 2002.9   
                                                 
5
 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Towards Global Tax Cooperation: 
Progress In Identifying And Eliminating Harmful Tax Practices, 2000, pp 9 and 18. 
6
 Ibid, p 25. 
7
 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. The OECD’s Project on Harmful Tax 
Practices: The 2001 Progress Report, 2001, p 9. 
8
 Sharman, J.C. ‘The bark is the bite: International organizations and blacklisting’,  Review of 
International Political Economy, Vol. 16, No. 4, October 2009, pp 573–596. 
9
 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. The OECD’s Project on Harmful Tax 
Practices: The 2001 Progress Report, 2001, p 10. 
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In addition, the OECD guaranteed that any defensive measures would not apply to the 
uncooperative tax havens any sooner than they would apply to OECD members with 
harmful preferential regimes. 10   Given that four OECD member-states – Austria, 
Belgium, Luxembourg and Switzerland – all maintained secrecy laws, and had 
abstained from the report, it was believed by many that sanctions would never get off 
the ground and that tax secrecy was safe for the foreseeable future.11 
 
The constructivists responded to these developments by arguing that tax havens had 
been able to successfully exploit the inherent, normative contradiction of the 
campaign.12   Because the very concept that competition could be harmful and should be 
suppressed went against the OECD’s founding, liberal economic principles, tax havens 
were able to take up these principles in a “mimetic challenge”.13  By lobbying on the 
basis of free-market principles in addition to norms of fairness, sovereignty and 
multilateralism, tax havens presented the OECD campaign as inconsistent with expected 
standards of appropriate behaviour.14  The credibility of the campaign was quickly lost 
and the OECD was unable to continue with its project in its existing format.15   
 
Although the OECD continued its campaign against tax havens in its new form 
targeting tax information exchange, it made no real progress.16  A new Exchange of 
Information (EOI) Article was added to both the OECD and United Nations’ (UN) 
                                                 
10
 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. The OECD’s Project on Harmful Tax 
Practices: The 2001 Progress Report, 2001, p 10. 
11
 Webb, Michael C. ‘Defining the Boundaries of Legitimate State Practice: Norms, Transnational Actors 
and the OECD’s Project on Harmful Tax Competition’, Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 
11, No. 4, October 2004, p 819 and Payne, Anthony. The Global Politics of Unequal Development, 
(Palgrave Macmillian: New York, 2005) p 157. 
12
 Sharman, J.C. ‘The agency of peripheral actors: small state tax havens and international regimes as 
weapons of the weak’, in John M. Hobson and Leonard Seabrooke (eds), Everyday Politics of the World 
Economy, (Cambridge University Press: New York, 2007), p 53. 
13
 Mistry, Percy S. and J.C. Sharman. Considering the consequences: the development implications of 
initiatives on taxation, anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism, (Commonwealth 
Secretariat, London, 2008) p 73. 
14
 Sharman, J.C. ‘International Organisations and the Implementation of New Financial Regulations by 
Blacklisting’, in Jutta Joachim, Bob Reinalda and Bertjan Verbeek (eds.). International Organisation and 
Implementation: Enforcers, Managers, Authorities? (Routledge: Hoboken, 2007), pp 48-61 and Sharman, 
J.C. Havens in a Storm: The Struggle for Global Tax Regulation, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006). 
15
 Sharman, J.C. Havens in a Storm: The Struggle for Global Tax Regulation, (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2006), p 5. 
16
 Webb, Michael C. ‘Defining the Boundaries of Legitimate State Practice: Norms, Transnational Actors 
and the OECD’s Project on Harmful Tax Competition’, Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 
11, No. 4, October 2004, p 819 and Payne, Anthony. The Global Politics of Unequal Development, 
(Palgrave Macmillian: New York, 2005) p 157. 
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model tax conventions to act as negotiating standards for bilateral tax treaties. 17  
However, Double Taxation Agreements (DTAs) were very rarely entered into by tax 
havens for the logical reason that there was no double taxation to relieve, and because 
these agreements by their nature must have reciprocal effect. The OECD therefore 
pushed for tax havens to sign on to Tax Information Exchange Agreements, or TIEAs.  
These alternative bilateral agreements enable states to share certain tax information held 
by one state at the request of the other, in limited circumstances.   But despite this, just 
23 TIEAs were signed globally between 2000 and 2007.18  As recently as 2007, the 
OECD project was thought to have almost entirely petered out, and many predicted that 
it would never achieve the breakthrough it needed to combat tax secrecy.19 
 
Following the height of the global financial crisis (GFC) in September 2008 with the 
collapse, takeover or bailout of financial institutions such as Lehman Brothers, Merrill 
Lynch and AIG, sudden and dramatic progress was made.  The G20 Washington 
Summit on 15 November 2008 directed governments to “vigorously address” the lack 
of transparency and tax information exchange 20  and in the months that followed, 
intensive negotiations were begun between the dominant G20 states and the key secrecy 
jurisdictions.  
 
Just weeks before the next G20 Summit in London on 2 April 2009, all the major 
secrecy jurisdictions including Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg and Switzerland 
suddenly removed their formal reservations and committed to the OECD standard of 
information exchange.21  In the wake of these announcements, it was revealed that the 
OECD planned to release a new blacklist on the day of the London Summit.22  The new 
                                                 
17
 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. The OECD’s Project on Harmful Tax 
Practices: The 2001 Progress Report, 2001, p 5. 
18
 Originally published by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, ‘Promoting 
Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes’, 18 August 2010, online at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/45/43757434.pdf accessed 23/08/2010, p 13. 
19
 Webb, Michael C. ‘Defining the Boundaries of Legitimate State Practice: Norms, Transnational Actors 
and the OECD’s Project on Harmful Tax Competition’, Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 
11, No. 4, October 2004, p 819 and Payne, Anthony. The Global Politics of Unequal Development, 
(Palgrave Macmillian: New York, 2005) p 157. 
20
 G20. ‘Declaration of the Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy’, 15 November 2008, 
available online at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/11/20081115-1.html, 
accessed 13/04/2010.  
21
 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. ‘OECD Assessment Shows Banking 
Secrecy as a Shield for Tax Evaders Coming to an End’, 31/08/2009, online at 
www.oecd.org/documentprint/0,3455,en_2649_34897_43592376_1111,00.html accessed 13/04/2010. 
22
 Mathiason, Nick. ‘Beginning of the End for Tax Havens’, The Guardian, 14/03/2009, online at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2009/mar/13/switzerland-tax-evasion-fight, accessed 23/08/2010 and 
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list assessed any state that had not signed on to at least 12 TIEAs (or DTAs containing 
Exchange of Information Articles) as either “not committed” or having “not 
substantially implemented” their commitments.23  These agreements instantly became 
the global standard by which to assess transparency and exchange of information.24 
Leaders at the G20 London Summit declared they were “ready to deploy sanctions to 
protect our public finances and financial systems. The era of banking secrecy is over.”25  
 
A new Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information was established by 
the OECD to monitor the effective implementation of the information exchange 
standard.  At its inaugural meeting in Mexico City on 1-2 September 2009, OECD 
Secretary-General Angel Gurria said:  
What has happened in the tax area over the past 10 months is nothing less than a 
revolution! ... For decades it has been possible for taxpayers to hide income and 
assets from the taxman by abusing bank secrecy or other impediments to 
information exchange. This will no longer be the case. Cooperation between tax 
administrations is now becoming the rule. The threshold of tolerance for tax 
evasion has dropped to zero.... We have delivered more in 10 months that we 
achieved in more than 10 years.26 
 
At the following G20 Summit in Pittsburgh on 24 – 25 September 2009, leaders stated 
that they were “ready to use countermeasures against tax havens from March 2010.”27  
By January 2010, over 300 TIEAs had been signed worldwide.28  No states still remain 
on the “not committed” blacklist.29  
 
                                                                                                                                               
Anon, ‘Switzerland Eases Banking Secrecy’, BBC, 13/03/2009, online at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7941717.stm, accessed 23/08/2010.  
23
 G20. ‘Global plan for recovery and reform: the Communiqué from the London Summit’, 2 April 2009, 
online at http://www.londonsummit.gov.uk/en/summit-aims/summit-communique/, accessed 13/04/2010.   
24
 Bubenzer, Peter. ‘OFCs in the Crosshairs but not Alone in their Struggle to Survive’, Offshore 
Investment, Issue 204, March 2010, p 3. 
25
 G20. ‘Global plan for recovery and reform: the Communiqué from the London Summit’, 2 April 2009, 
online at http://www.londonsummit.gov.uk/en/summit-aims/summit-communique/, accessed 13/04/2010.   
26
 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. ‘Remarks by Angel Gurria at the Global 
Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information’, 02/09/2009, online at 
www.oecd.org/documentprint/0,3455,en_2649_344487_43596999_1_1_1_1,00.html accessed 
13/04/2010. 
27
 G20. ‘Leaders' Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit, 24 – 25 September 2009, online at 
http://www.pittsburghsummit.gov/mediacenter/129639.htm, accessed 13/04/2010.  
28Owens, Jeffery. “Taking Forward the G20 Tax Initiative”, Interview by OECD TV, 18 January  2010, 
available on YouTube at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U4MgXdG7MYU, accessed 13/04/2010. 
29
 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. ‘A Progress Report on the Jurisdictions 
Surveyed by the OECD Global Forum in Implementing the Internationally Agreed Tax Standard’, 18 
August 2010, online at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/0/43606256.pdf accessed 23/08/2010, accessed 
23/08/2010. 
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Given that banking secrecy had remained firmly entrenched and largely non-negotiable 
in many jurisdictions despite years of OECD work against it, the suddenness of the 
concessions on banking secrecy has been stunning.  
 
The question this thesis explores is why the OECD campaign against tax havens (in its 
most recent form, against banking secrecy) has succeeded so suddenly despite its set-
back in 2001 and the following years of stagnation.  
 
This thesis will describe the emergence of tax havens and ensuing debate over their 
value.  The origins of the OECD campaign and its early work are described and a 
neoliberal account is provided for the project’s change of focus in 2001.  The decline of 
the campaign is discussed leading up to the dramatic breakthroughs in banking secrecy 
in the wake of the GFC.  The role of G20 leaders in bringing about a global standard for 
tax information exchange is explained in terms of a structural change that affected 
domestic political economies in a way that reshaped state interests.  The havens’ 
compliance is attributed to coercion through both the anticipated consequences of 
blacklisting and imminent sanctions.  Finally, the future of tax information exchange is 
considered in light of the new Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of 
Information.  The effectiveness of Tax Information Exchange Agreements is deliberated 
and the likelihood of mock compliance is assessed. 
 
The thesis finds that the structural effect of the GFC shifted the interests of dominant 
OECD states in a way which aligned them with the OECD’s dormant movement against 
secrecy jurisdictions.  This neoliberal institutionalist argument challenges the body of 
constructivist literature that has, so far, interpreted the fight against tax havens as 
intrinsically linked to the reputations and identities of states and of the OECD itself.  
The dramatic developments of the past two years appear to undermine the current 
constructivist explanation of the OECD campaign, which provides a springboard to look 
further back at the fight against tax havens to reinterpret it from a neoliberal perspective.  
 
This reinterpretation reveals that transformative change happens in accordance with 
state interests rather than identities.  For international institutions representing state 
interests (here being the OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs), their policies are 
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effective only when there is alignment between the interests of its most powerful 
member-states.  
 
Background: tax havens and banking secrecy 
The term ‘tax haven’ has been widely used since the 1950s, yet there has never been 
consensus on its meaning. 30   In the broadest sense, it is used to denote offshore 
jurisdictions where tax residence can be relocated in order to escape local taxation laws.   
 
Tax havens first became possible with the invention of fictional tax residence – the 
separation of legal residence from the physical location of business activities or 
investments.31  Fictional tax residence dates back to the turn of the 20th Century with the 
United Kingdom House of Lords case of De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v Howe.  
The Court held that that a company’s residency for tax purposes depended on where the 
“centre of management and control” was located, rather than where the company was 
incorporated. 32    This decision was adopted by lawmakers in most common law 
jurisdictions and became an accepted standard for tax residence.33  
 
The modern tax haven results from discordance between the increasing 
internationalisation of capital through forces of globalisation and the parallel insulation 
of the sovereign state in law.34  The fact that individual state governments maintained 
the right to determine their tax rules in the context of nomadic capital searching for the 
highest net return on investment led states to use their law-making authority as a 
competitive advantage.35  In the age of the social state and correspondingly high tax 
rates in the developed world, mobile capital was easily lured to states offering low or no 
taxation. 
 
                                                 
30
 Palan, Ronen. ‘The History of Tax Havens’, History and Policy, online at 
http://www.historyandpolicy.org/papers/policy-paper-92.html, accessed 10/03/10. 
31
 Webb, Michael C. ‘Defining the Boundaries of Legitimate State Practice: Norms, Transnational Actors 
and the OECD’s Project on Harmful Tax Competition’, Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 
11,  No. 4, October 2004, p 802. 
32
 De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v Howe, (UK) (1906) 5 TC 198 5TC213. 
33
 Murphy, Richard. "Tax Justice and secrecy jurisdictions" Soundings 41 (2009), p 66. 
34
 Palan, Ronen. ‘Tax Havens and the Commercialisation of State Sovereignty’, International 
Organisation, Vol. 56, No. 1, 2002, p 153. 
35
 Palan, Ronen.  The Offshore World: Sovereign Markets, Virtual Places, and Nomad Millionaires 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003). 
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Because the centre of management and control of a multinational company is difficult to 
prove, companies may conduct activities elsewhere but fly the directors to a low/no tax 
jurisdiction for its annual meetings in order to claim that this is where control is 
exercised.  Often as little as a plaque at the reception of a building in the low/no tax 
jurisdiction has been used to establish the head office of the company despite the 
absence of the company directors. This is popularly known as a “brass plate company”.  
The most famous brass plate company headquarters is Ugland House in the Cayman 
Islands, a five-storey building where 12,000 corporations claim to be headquartered.  
Subsidiaries of Coca-Cola, Procter & Gamble, General Motors, Intel, FedEx and Sprint 
all claim to be based there.36 
 
The modern tax laws of most states now apply multiple bases for tax residence.  For 
companies, this includes a range of factors intended to capture both the place of 
incorporation and the centre of management and control.37  This means that in offshore 
situations there may be multiple taxing rights and unless a Double Taxation Agreement 
allocates a primary taxing right to one country, the income may be taxed more than once.  
This approach means that to escape the home country’s tax net, the company must both 
incorporate and have its centre of management and control in a foreign jurisdiction.  In 
practice this is often not difficult to do, and tax havens may deliberately make these 
processes easy to attract foreign business. 
 
But in the age of the multinational company, changes in tax residence are necessarily 
common and most often occur between states with similar levels of taxation. Therefore, 
the modern definition of a tax haven also requires that the offshore jurisdiction offers a 
tax saving through low or no taxation.  Even still, this definition would capture any 
country with tax rates significantly below the OECD average, including countries such 
as Ireland and Singapore, which have uniform low company tax rates. While the 
attraction of foreign capital is likely to have been a key driver for these low tax rates, 
low company tax rates are also employed to encourage domestic investment and growth 
of local business.  
 
                                                 
36
 Leary, Alex. ‘Obama Targets Cayman “Tax Scam”’, PolitiFact, 09/01/2008, online at 
http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2008/jan/09/obama-targets-cayman-islands-tax-scam/ 
accessed 23/05/2010. 
37
 For example, see the section YD 2 of the New Zealand Income Tax Act 2007 and section 23A(2) of 
Ireland’s Taxes Consolidation Act 1997.  
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In addition, it can be very difficult to prove that the reason the taxing right has shifted 
from one country to another is due to a deliberate intent on the part of the taxpayer to 
take advantage of a foreign low tax rate.  For example, companies may take advantage 
of low/no tax jurisdictions by allocating their intellectual property (IP) rights (such as 
the company brand, product design or recipe) to a company incorporated and managed 
in a low/no tax jurisdiction.  The company then sets up subsidiaries in high tax 
jurisdictions which conduct business and generate profit.  The IP-owning parent 
company can charge the subsidiary royalties for the use of its IP.  This reduces the 
taxable profits in the high tax jurisdiction and instead transfers the profits so it is subject 
to taxation in the low/no tax jurisdiction.  There are many legitimate reasons why a 
company would restructure this way, and provided that the taxation result is merely a 
by-product rather than a primary intention behind the structure it usually does not 
constitute tax avoidance.  
 
Some definitions add a “reputation test” to assess whether a state offers itself or is 
generally perceived to offer itself as a place to be used by non-residents to escape tax in 
their country of residence.  This subjective approach was adopted by the OECD in an 
early (1987) report and has been retained as one factor that may contribute to a state’s 
classification as a tax haven.38 This is obviously a problematic assessment, as it might 
be possible to deem any country with a low tax rate as having deliberately enacted tax 
legislation to attract business from higher taxed jurisdictions.39 
 
The OECD’s definitive classification of a tax haven was contained in its 1998 report on 
Harmful Tax Competition.  The report defined a tax haven as having four elements:40  
1. No or nominal taxation; 
2. No substantial activities; 
3. Lack of effective information exchange; and 
4. Lack of legal transparency. 
 
                                                 
38
 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging 
Global Issue, 1998, p 18. 
39
 Palan, Ronen. ‘Tax Havens and the Commercialisation of State Sovereignty’, International 
Organisation, Vol. 56, No. 1, 2002, p 154. 
40
 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging 
Global Issue, 1998, p 18. 
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The no or nominal taxation element requires no further explanation.  The assessment of 
whether there are substantial activities was intended to indicate that a jurisdiction may 
be attempting to attract investment or transactions that are purely tax driven.41 It might 
also mean that a state is unable to commercially compete for capital and business in the 
absence of the tax advantages that it offers.42 
 
Effective information exchange refers to the sharing of tax information between 
authorities, usually under a Double Taxation Agreement (DTA) or a Tax Information 
Exchange Agreement (TIEA).  In a globalised economy, governments often cannot rely 
on domestic information sources to enforce their tax laws, so information exchange is 
employed to deter non-compliance.43  If a state does not have any such agreements, or it 
has only the form of such agreements with limited or no real effect, this is usually the 
result of strict secrecy requirements under domestic banking laws that prevent the 
collection and sharing of information. 
 
The transparency element is therefore closely related to the exchange of information 
requirement.  It refers to the domestic secrecy laws of a state, for example maintenance 
of anonymous accounts and/or criminal penalties for breaching client confidentiality. 
Such laws mean that tax administrators are unable to seek information on suspected tax 
evasion and are therefore unable to provide such information if it is requested by 
another jurisdiction.  Consequently, states that maintain such laws are unable to sign on 
to bilateral or multilateral information exchange agreements.   
 
Secrecy is essential to tax havens because it allows people to take advantage of the 
benefits of tax havens with the assurance that their home jurisdictions will not be able to 
hold them accountable. This secrecy is often viewed as facilitating both tax evasion and 
money laundering.44 
 
                                                 
41
 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging 
Global Issue, 1998, p 23. 
42Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. The OECD’s Project on Harmful Tax 
Practices: The 2001 Progress Report, 2001, p 5. 
43
 Ibid, p 5. 
44
 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging 
Global Issue, 1998, p 24. 
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Following the 2001 Progress Report, the OECD now only targets the lack of effective 
exchange of information and transparency aspects of tax havens.45  These aspects will 
together be referred to from now on simply as secrecy.   
 
Switzerland has long been viewed as a “stronghold of banking secrecy”.46 Banking 
secrecy first developed as part of Swiss customary law as early as the 16th Century and 
became more widely practiced during the French Revolution.47 But it was not until 1934 
that Swiss banking secrecy was afforded official protection under the Penal Code. The 
1934 Swiss Banking Law rendered “enquiry or research into the 'trade secrets' of banks 
and other organisations a criminal offence.”48  
 
It is widely claimed that secrecy was included in the Swiss Banking Law to protect Jews 
and other “enemies of the State” from having assets confiscated by Nazi Germany.49 
However, Murphy argues that this is “wholly untrue” and that Swiss banking secrecy 
was instead enacted in response to a political scandal in early 1930s France, when it was 
revealed that many high profile citizens were evading tax through the use of Swiss 
banks.50 
 
Whatever the case, Swiss banking secrecy provided assurance to investors that their 
affairs would be kept from the authorities at home.  It was quickly emulated by other 
states including Austria, the Bahamas, Liechtenstein and Luxembourg.51  Tax evasion is 
not a crime in most secrecy jurisdictions, therefore individuals cannot be extradited for 
alleged tax evasion.52 
 
It should be noted that banking secrecy may hide a range of information, including both 
the identity of account holders and transaction details.  It therefore has a number of 
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benefits beyond tax avoidance.  Secrecy can enable criminal activities such as money 
laundering or bribery, which are targeted by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).53  
Secrecy can also be an advantage in private legal matters such as relationship property 
disputes and will contestations.  A lack of transparency may also reduce the cost of 
commercial transactions by reducing regulatory obligations (companies registered in tax 
havens may not have to perform public audits or maintain a central register of 
shareholders).54  So although banking secrecy has a range of benefits, the OECD project 
combats secrecy only in relation to taxation.  
 
In addition to tax haven secrecy, the OECD has targeted “preferential regimes.” These 
are special tax concessions that apply only to foreigners and are “ring-fenced” from the 
domestic economy.  It can be concluded that such tax rules are adopted for the sole 
purpose of attracting foreign investment, because the state is not willing to bear the cost 
of lost revenue from its own tax base.55  In Palan’s words, “the motive of these states is 
to draw rent surpluses from the income that would otherwise accrue to larger states.”56  
Preferential regimes are fairly commonly used by OECD member-states and their 
characteristics are carefully distinguished from those of tax havens.  
 
What’s so wrong with tax havens? 
Over the course of its campaign, the OECD has cited a plethora of reasons to explain 
why tax havens are harmful.  It has claimed that tax havens: 
• Erode the tax base of home jurisdictions; 
• Are a source of “unfair” competition; 
• Distort investment flows; 
• Force governments to shift taxation away from mobile capital to less mobile 
sources such as labour and land; 
• Raise the costs of state tax administration and compliance costs of taxpayers; 
                                                 
53
 Murphy, Richard. "Tax Justice and secrecy jurisdictions," Soundings, vol. 41 (Spring 2009), p 71. 
54Ibid,  pp 68-69 and Sharman, J.C. ‘Norms, coercion and contracting in the struggle against 'harmful' tax’ 
competition, Australian Journal of International Affairs Vol. 60, No. 1, pp. 143_/169, March 2006, pp 
145-146. 
55
 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. The OECD’s Project on Harmful Tax 
Practices: The 2001 Progress Report, 2001, p 5. 
56
 Palan, Ronen. ‘Tax Havens and the Commercialisation of State Sovereignty’, International 
Organisation, Vol. 56, No. 1, 2002, p 152. 
 13
• Reduce regulation and transparency of companies; 
• Undermine faith in the equity of tax systems.57 
 
However, these often-cited arguments against tax havens are not universally accepted. 
There is a significant alternative argument which views tax havens as an essential and 
even useful part of a free global market.  This view has had particular resonance within 
the United States.  
 
It has been accepted by the domestic Courts of most OECD countries that a person 
bears the right to structure their affairs so as to minimise their tax burden.  This has 
given rise to legal debate surrounding the distinctions between tax minimisation, tax 
avoidance and tax evasion, and of which practices might fall into each category.  If one 
can accept that in a free-market society it is desirable for individuals and companies to 
reduce their tax burden within the limits of the law, it is also reasonable to consider that 
tax competition might be good for the global economy.58 
 
At a basic level, tax havens are seen to promote economic growth and healthy 
competition.  Some US economists have found that the presence of tax havens has led 
to an increase in economic activity in nearby non-tax havens.  This is because 
multinational firms can enjoy higher after-tax returns and therefore can maintain higher 
levels of foreign investment than they could otherwise.59 
 
It is argued that tax havens act to regulate the levels of taxation applied by other 
governments.  The sovereign state has a monopoly over the taxation of its citizens, and 
without competition between states for mobile capital, the government could 
theoretically set its tax rates as high as it desired.  In addition, the government can 
impose whatever regulative requirements it chooses.  From the perspective of economic 
growth, the lower the tax rates and the lower the compliance costs, the better. Therefore 
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tax havens help to ensure that states do not abuse their monopoly to the detriment of the 
wider economy.60 
 
Beyond the monopoly of a single state to tax its citizens, there is concern that the OECD 
might seek to achieve tax coordination between jurisdictions, leading to a global 
monopoly.  A University of Copenhagen study has found that co-ordination of state tax 
policies would lead to higher capital taxes and higher wealth redistribution — but lower 
infrastructure spending, lower capital stocks, lower profits, lower real wages, lower 
GDP, and higher real interest rates.61 
 
It is alternatively argued that the state’s sovereign monopoly over taxation is sacrosanct.  
The state has the right to apply whatever laws it sees fit, including laws which enable it 
to compete against other states for capital. 62   This is a rational policy to pursue, 
particularly for developing states that may have structural disadvantages, such as 
geographical distance from global financial centres or a lack of natural resources.  
Special tax incentives may be employed in order to offset non-tax disadvantages, 
including any additional costs of relocating to such areas.63  
 
Up until the 1990s, setting up shop as a tax haven was sometimes viewed as a legitimate 
development strategy for small island nations that had little other means of attracting 
capital.   Some were actively encouraged by states with large financial centres in the 
hope that a nearby tax shelter would attract more active business to the main centre.  
The United Kingdom is one such state that encouraged its associated overseas territories 
and dependencies to develop offshore financial centres to help maintain London’s status 
as a global financial centre.64 
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Advocates of this view often respond to the OECD’s condemnation of tax havens by 
stating that it is not the practices of tax havens that cause the problems it cites, but 
rather the citizens of OECD member-states who abuse tax havens.65   By targeting 
secrecy laws instead of the tax laws of havens, the OECD is seeking to enable its 
member-states to punish its own citizens instead of tax havens.  Therefore the OECD 
campaign since November 2001 has been less offensive to those who adhere to this 
view.   
 
Beyond this conventional debate for and against tax havens, Palan argues that tax 
havens are: 
“a case of having your cake and eating it: maintaining the sovereign state system, 
as organiser and mediator of conflict and tension, and yet removing the threat of 
regulation and taxation associated with the state – all done in the name of and by 
the state system itself.”66 
Therefore, for better or worse, tax havens are seen to be an integral part of maintaining 
the sovereign state system in the context of global economic markets.67 
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Chapter Two: A Review of the Constructivist Literature 
The predominant explanation among political economists of the OECD campaign 
against tax havens has, so far, been constructivist.  
 
Constructivism in international relations 
Constructivism is an agental rather than a structural theory, which explains the status 
quo as the result of the particular identities and interests of interacting states.68    For 
constructivists, interests and identities are not structurally determined.  Rather, they are 
defined through the process of interaction.69 Identities are collective meanings built over 
time through repeated interactions giving rise to expectations for future interactions.  
States then determine their interests and act towards other states in accordance with the 
intersubjective expectations of what is appropriate behaviour.70 
 
Constructivists argue that state behaviour is constrained by a “logic of appropriateness”.  
In other words, states decide what they ought to do in consideration of the social context 
in which they find themselves.  Shifting international norms may change what is 
appropriate, and states may in turn change their policies because it is seen as appropriate 
to do so.  In this way, norms are able to redefine state interests.71  
 
Constructivists say that instances of cooperation between states, even for self-interested 
reasons, initiate a process of interest-reconstruction in terms of shared commitments to 
social norms.  Cooperation therefore alters states’ conceptions of Self and Other in the 
direction of developing a collective identity.72  
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For constructivists, agency plays an important part in the formulation of ideas, which 
then become sedimented as a discourse.73  In turn, entrenched assumptions become self-
fulfilling in their logic. 74   
 
Constructivists view institutions as inseparable from the understandings that states bring 
to their actions. 75  Institutions are established on the basis of shared meaning or 
collective intentionality, and may be cooperative or conflictual. 76   Thus, a social 
institution is a self-reinforcing, objective social fact, which certain states may have a 
vested interest in reproducing.77  
 
On this basis, constructivists argue that international institutions such as the OECD have 
gone beyond simply regulating states’ behaviour and have also established 
intersubjective frameworks of understanding by which member-states determine and 
agree on the appropriateness of certain behaviours in accordance with this framework.78   
 
The constructivist explanation of the OECD campaign 
Jason Sharman is the predominant contributor to current constructivist explanations of 
the OECD campaign against tax havens.  He has followed the OECD project for a 
number of years and has updated his argument in response to developments between 
1998 and 2006.   
 
Sharman argues that the OECD campaign began in response to a widespread normative 
discourse that viewed globalisation as an uncontrollable force eroding the economic and 
political sovereignty of states.  Sharman contends that this view of globalisation was 
adhered to and promoted by the OECD Secretariat, and also aligned with the beliefs of 
national policy-makers. Therefore the normative framework of globalisation as 
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‘Prometheus Unbound’79  informed the interpretation of state interests so that states 
became convinced of the need for a coordinated response to tax competition.80 
 
When the OECD published its first blacklist in 2000, Sharman argued that this was a 
‘speech act’ that changed the reputation of states merely by virtue of being published.81  
The list of states that the OECD deemed to be tax havens named and shamed those 
states.  Therefore “the bark”, being the publication of a state’s name on the blacklist, 
was in fact “the bite”, because the damage it did to the state’s reputation caused 
instantaneous and automatic harm.82   This is what caused tax havens to comply with 
the OECD’s demands, despite a lack of either inducements or sanctions.83 
 
The “bite” of the blacklists came from the authority lent by the OECD’s reputation for 
impartiality and technocracy.  This reputation gives the OECD the authority to shape 
international public policy.84  Therefore the OECD depended on its identity for the 
authority of its blacklists – without this the blacklist would merely have delivered an 
easily ignored “bark”.  To maintain its authority and legitimacy, the OECD was bound 
by the normative standards which it promoted. 
 
When the OECD scaled back its project in 2001, Sharman argued that this was because 
tax havens had been able to successfully exploit the inherent, normative contradiction of 
the campaign.  The contradiction was simple – the OECD’s founding purpose was to 
advance principles of free-market capitalism, yet the Harmful Tax Competition project 
suggested that firstly, competition could be harmful, and secondly, that such 
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competition between states should be eliminated. 85   Sharman has termed this as 
“rhetorical self-entrapment.”86   
 
Sharman argued that the tax haven states exploited this contradiction by employing the 
normative arguments of the OECD in a “mimetic challenge” within other organisations 
(such as the Commonwealth, the Caribbean Community and the Pacific Islands Forum) 
and to powerful OECD states, in particular the United States.  Sharman contended that 
tax havens managed to persuade the US as well as other OECD member-states that the 
OECD’s framing of the campaign was inconsistent with liberal economic theory in 
addition to norms of fairness, sovereignty and multilateralism.  Norms “shape the 
instruments or means that states find available and appropriate” and also what means 
are unavailable and inappropriate.87  Sharman goes on to state that the OECD’s identity 
is partly constituted by expectations of appropriate behaviour that conflict with the 
coercive nature of blacklisting88  Therefore, the OECD was unable to continue with its 
project in its existing format because the credibility of the campaign had been lost.89   
 
There is a circular logic to Sharman’s explanations of both the initial success of the 
blacklisting and the 2001 failure of the OECD’s project on Harmful Tax Competition: 
“the way an actor is perceived affects the impact of its rhetoric; the rhetoric of an actor, 
or of third parties about that actor, in turn affect the way others perceive it.”90 This 
provided an explanation for why the conflict appeared to have been resolved in the 
favour of tax havens and against the perceived interests of wealthy and powerful 
states.91 
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Michael Webb has provided a similar explanation wedded to constructivist assumptions 
about the internalisation of norms.  Webb states that: “Normative considerations 
influence states’ decisions about the priority to attach to their different interests.”92  
Constructivists define norms as “standards of appropriate behaviour for actors with a 
given identity.”93  Therefore, Webb views arguments regarding what is appropriate as 
bearing a normative, persuasive weight in negotiations between states.94  
 
In the international taxation arena, Webb argues that international organisation officials 
“are a crucial part of the audience which judges the appropriateness of state policies, 
and the judgements of these non-state actors heavily influence the judgements made by 
state members of the audience.” 95   
 
Webb agrees with Sharman’s explanation for the failure of the OECD project in 2001.  
By using the OECD’s own arguments against them, OECD officials were forced to 
acknowledge the legitimacy of the arguments made by the havens and the havens’ 
supporters.  The fact that in 2001 havens were able to win the battle that had been raged 
against them, despite the OECD’s overwhelming economic power over them, “suggests 
that who has the better argument in intergovernmental deliberations is not solely 
determined by state power; the logic of arguing does have an impact independent of the 
logic of consequences.” 96 
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Chapter Three: Approach - Neoliberal Institutionalism 
Neoliberal institutionalism is an alternative international relations approach, which will 
be applied to critique the explanation of the OECD campaign against tax havens offered 
by the existing constructivist literature and to explain recent developments. 
 
Neoliberal institutionalists (hereafter, “neoliberals”) assume that all states rationally 
pursue their interests and that these interests are objective and structurally determined.   
So in contrast to constructivism’s “logic of appropriateness”, neoliberal institutionalism 
contends that states make decisions on the basis of a “logic of (anticipated) 
consequences,” whereby states make a rational calculation of how certain actions will 
affect their interests before choosing the course of action that maximises their gains.97  
 
It follows that if interests are determined by the structural environment, and behaviour 
can be predicted in accordance with interests, then the status quo of the international 
system has been shaped by structural causes.  Therefore, structural changes, such as a 
global economic recession, may bring about changes in state interests and behaviour.  In 
this sense, neoliberalism is a predictive theory, as a change in the structure determines 
logical consequences.98 
 
Joseph Nye has contributed the concept of “soft power” to the neoliberal field, arguing 
that rational actors may use attraction to obtain its interests rather than coercion or 
payment.99 Soft power is framing the preferences of others in order to get them to want 
the outcomes that you want – it co-opts its subjects through attraction.100  Therefore a 
state may be able to further its agenda by causing other states to want to follow it, to 
admire its values, to emulate and aspire to its prosperity or way of life.101  Persuasion 
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and the ability to move people by argument is an important part of soft power102 and the 
values, practices and policies of a state or international organisation are crucial.103  If a 
state is able to combine both hard and soft power, it has even more effective “smart 
power.”104 
 
It should be noted that the neoliberal utilitarian rationality is conceived more broadly 
than by neorealists, because neoliberals consider the pursuit of long-term absolute gains 
as potentially more rational than maximising short-term relative gains.105 The logical 
conclusion is that states will cooperate where they identify significant common 
interests.106   Therefore neoliberals view cooperation as a more likely outcome than 
neorealists, however cooperation remains a strategic interaction rather than a social one 
as conceived by constructivists.107 
 
Cooperation always comes at the risk of defection and the rewards for a single actor 
might be greater if it can cheat or free-load on the benefits of others’ cooperation. In the 
world of tax havens and global finance, havens fear that if they cooperate with the 
OECD, other havens might not comply, and this would enable tax avoiders to simply 
move their funds to non-complying havens. Unless all havens abide by the new 
standards, those that do will lose business to those that do not. This is a classic example 
of a collective goods dilemma. 
 
International institutions have emerged as a way to mediate cooperation in order to 
prevent cheating and free-loading to ensure that collective goals are fulfilled.108  They 
do this in a number of different ways, such as by facilitating discussion, setting agreed 
standards, lending credibility to commitments, providing technical assistance, 
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coordinating actions, sharing information, and through monitoring, sanctions and other 
means of enforcement.109 
 
Institutions are formed on the basis of shared interests, rather than shared meanings, and 
exist for as long as they continue to serve common interests.  Institutions are often 
formed in response to a structural shift, such as the beginning of a war or fiscal crisis, 
because such international events can have a similar impact on the interests of a number 
of different states. A new alignment of individual state interests might give rise to 
collective interests which provide an impetus for cooperation.   
 
Institutions may equally survive a structural change if the consequent change in 
interests results in new collective goals.  As circumstances change, so may 
institutions.110 But each state will only continue to cooperate to the extent that doing so 
is in its long-term interests.  Where an institution ceases to facilitate absolute gains for 
its members, it will lose its relevance.  
 
Cooperation both directly between states and through mediating institutions has, over 
time, led to complex, strategic interdependence between states.  This interconnectedness 
increases the likelihood of collective goods and therefore provides further motivation 
for states to cooperate.111  
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Chapter Four: Case Study - the OECD Campaign against 
Harmful Taxation 
 
The key institution in the tax havens case study is the Organisation for Economic 
Development and Cooperation (OECD).  The OECD has 32 member-states, including 
European, North American and Australasian states, as well as Japan, Korea, Mexico and 
Chile.112  These are all relatively wealthy countries, the majority of which are capital 
exporting.  
 
The OECD is made up of three major parts: the OECD Council, the Secretariat and 
Committees.  The Council is the OECD’s decision-making body and is made up of one 
representative per member country, plus a representative of the European Commission.  
The Secretariat is composed of 2,500 independent professional staff drawn from OECD 
member countries and based predominantly in Paris.  Its staff carry out work as directed 
by the Council.  Finally, there are roughly 250 committees, working groups and expert 
groups involving 40,000 senior officials from national administrations who attend 
OECD meetings and contribute to work as directed by the OECD Council and 
sometimes in partnership with the OECD Secretariat.113 
 
The OECD – promoter of norms or state interests?  
According to its 1960 Convention, the OECD’s aims are to promote policies designed 
to achieve: 
• the highest sustainable economic growth in its member countries (including 
growth in employment and standards of living); 
• the maintenance of financial stability; 
• the sound economic expansion of member-states; 
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• the economic development of non-member countries; and  
• the non-discriminatory expansion of world trade.114  
 
These are goals which could easily be seen to be in the rational, collective interests of 
all OECD member-states.  However, it could equally be argued that they appear to be 
normative goals supportive of liberal economic theory.  As an institution, the OECD has 
been termed “a missionary for values of liberalisation”.115  However the extent to which 
these norms are promoted by the OECD due to some kind of intrinsic normative value, 
and the extent to which they rather act as vehicles employed to further the objective 
interests of the OECD member-states, is a moot point between constructivists and 
neoliberals. 
 
From a constructivist standpoint, the OECD is a norm promoter with a degree of 
independence and the ability to socialise states and to redefine state interests.  
Constructivists emphasise the role of the independent, technocratic Secretariat in 
promoting policies aligned to the OECD’s normative goals and in socialising the 
member-state representatives in the Council and Committees so that state interests are 
reconsidered in accordance with these normative goals. 
 
The OECD operates on the basis of consensus decision-making and voluntary 
cooperation.  In the near absence of binding agreements and powers of enforcement, 
constructivists view the consensus imperative as a key way in which states are 
socialised into normative agreement with their peers.  By including all members in 
decision-making, states buy into the establishment of international standards of 
appropriate behaviour.  This behaviour is then reinforced through monitoring 
procedures and peer reviews to socialise states and to institutionalise OECD norms.116    
 
Constructivists view the OECD as having an identity as a promoter of liberal economic 
norms.  This identity binds the OECD to behave in a way that is consistent with the 
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norms it promotes.117  As a norm entrepreneur, the OECD is influential only to the 
extent that its reputation for objectivity and its legitimacy as a technocratic authority 
remain intact. 118  
 
From a neoliberal perspective, the OECD is an institution formed by states with the 
fundamental underlying motivation of advancing common member-state interests to 
achieve absolute economic gains.  The promotion of liberal economic norms is seen to 
support and advance member-state interests.  Therefore norms have no intrinsic value 
beyond their ability to persuade others in such a way that allows a state or group of 
states to advance its individual or collective interests.  
 
Neoliberals focus on the OECD Council and Committees as they are composed of 
national representatives who are held accountable to their individual state governments.  
The centre of power within the OECD is the Council and therefore no decision can be 
made without the agreement of member-state governments.  Although the Council and 
Committees may be influenced by advice from the OECD Secretariat, the Secretariat is 
funded by and therefore to a large degree accountable to the member-states.  
 
The Committee on Fiscal Affairs – engine room of the OECD campaign 
The OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs (CFA) sets the OECD tax work programme, 
while its detailed work is carried out by a number of subsidiary working parties.  
Decisions taken by the CFA generally require the approval of the OECD Council.  Both 
the CFA and its working parties consist entirely of senior civil service tax experts from 
member governments. 119  Non-member state servants sometimes also take part in 
discussions.120  
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Outside the CFA, these high-level civil servants also provide policy advice to their 
governments.  While they can generally discuss their technocratic views freely within 
the working parties, they ultimately serve their government ministers.  Issues are 
debated with regard to individual state contexts and laws.121  
 
Outcomes from discussions within the working parties are usually in the form of CFA 
reports which state the OECD view or approach to particular issues.  Draft reports are 
often made available for comment by business groups and private tax organisations and 
these comments may inform the working party discussion.  These reports often indicate 
diverging views between states, and they act as recommendations which are non-
binding on governments.  
 
However, there is some debate as to the level of persuasiveness these reports might 
offer to domestic courts for interpretation in legal disputes and therefore officials are 
cautious to ensure that the wording of the reports does not go against their state’s 
policies.  The reports are written during working party meetings and individual words 
are often debated at length.  Where officials representing different states disagree, care 
is taken to achieve language vague enough to satisfy all views, and where this cannot be 
achieved, wording is deleted entirely.122   
 
Often the work of the CFA working parties results in changes to the OECD Model 
Taxation Convention text or commentary.  These changes are made by Working Party 
One and do not require consensus; however states that disagree with the dominant view 
are able to lodge reservations against changes to the text and observations to changes to 
the commentary.   The Model Convention itself is not binding on states, but it acts as a 
starting point for bilateral tax treaty negotiations, therefore a reservation indicates to 
negotiating partners that a state intends to depart from the Model.123 
 
The OECD Model contains an article on Exchange of Information (EOI), which 
provides for governments to share their tax records when requested by their treaty 
partners for the purposes of carrying out the domestic tax laws of the requesting state. 
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Until 2009, Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg and Switzerland had reserved against this 
article and agreed to only very limited versions, if any, in their bilateral treaties.124  The 
OECD Model is also frequently used in bilateral negotiations between non-OECD 
countries, however it holds arguably less persuasive influence in interpreting these 
treaties than it does between OECD member-states, due to the lack of non-member-state 
participation in the drafting of the Model Convention. 
  
It is the CFA that determines the content of the OECD Model Taxation Convention and 
makes decisions on tax issues, which are endorsed by the OECD Council.  It is also the 
body that has consistently overseen the OECD campaign against tax havens in its 
various forms since 1998.125  It is made up entirely of senior civil servants who fly in 
and out of Paris several times a year from their respective capitals.  The debates within 
its Working Parties are framed by the laws and policies of the member-states.  It is 
therefore fundamentally representative of state interests. 
 
What started the movement against tax havens? 
From a neoliberal perspective, the OECD campaign was a collective response to a 
fundamentally structural cause: economic globalisation.  Economic globalisation refers 
in a general sense to the proliferation of finance and trade that crosses, penetrates and 
transcends state borders.126 The rapid integration of state economies has been facilitated 
by concurrent advances in communication technology and international law, which have 
in turn enabled international banking.  As a result, capital mobility has rapidly become 
an international phenomenon.127 
 
The structural fact of the mobility of capital across borders has had the consequence of 
rapidly decreasing the ability of states to enforce their taxation laws.  Of course, not all 
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sources of taxation are highly mobile.  Generally, labour is the least mobile source of 
tax revenue and therefore is the least sensitive to changes in tax rates.  People 
commonly make decisions about where they will live for non-economic reasons and are 
often constrained by immigration laws.   
 
On the other hand, companies generally have greater freedom to locate wherever in the 
world is most economically efficient.  The tax rate that the company will be subjected to 
may be a significant factor in determining where a company will be based, although 
other factors, such as the location of those who run the business, or the location of 
customers, are often of greater relevance.  If it is possible to keep all such variables 
constant, the rational, profit-maximising company will choose to locate in the country 
with the lower tax rate, because its after-tax profits will be highest.   
 
Investment income (or capital) is the most sensitive to taxation, because it has become 
very easily relocatable.  Money can be transferred between jurisdictions with the click 
of a mouse, and the rational economic investor is motivated only by the highest 
financial return.  Therefore investment capital is highly susceptible to being lured away 
from its country of origin by low or non-existent tax rates offered by tax havens. 
 
By undercutting the tax rates of most OECD countries, tax havens were seen to 
facilitate the movement of investment capital offshore.  OECD member-states with 
traditionally high taxation and social spending policies discovered that not only were 
they losing the tax revenue from capital sources, but that they were also losing their core 
capital wealth to low-tax jurisdictions.   
 
This realisation was heightened by a series of monetary crises in the early-mid 1990s, 
such as the 1992 ‘Black Wednesday’ crisis in the United Kingdom and the Mexican 
Peso crisis in 1994.  Although there were a multitude of identifiable reasons for these 
crises, the swift actions of investors in withdrawing and/or injecting capital were, at the 
very least, aggravating features, which served to illustrate that free-market forces alone 
were unable to construct a secure liberal financial order.128 Left unchecked, free markets 
allowed for rapid and potentially highly destructive capital flight that could ruin state 
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and regional economies almost overnight.129  This realisation led to a renewed focus on 
regulation by governments and international financial institutions.  Financial crises had 
to be controlled in order that they might be prevented.130    
 
In the context of taxation, fear of capital flight gave rise to the concept of an 
international ‘race-to-the-bottom’ in corporate and investment tax rates.  It became 
widely believed that tax havens were leading governments to aggressively compete with 
one another for a limited supply of capital by continually lowering their tax rates.  Left 
unregulated, the laws of the global economic market would present states with two 
options: either cut tax rates to competitive levels (thus making corresponding cuts to 
social spending), or lose economic capital and therefore potential economic growth.   
 
Although it has been noted that this is viewed by some as healthy competition that may 
lead to a net increase in global capital, the ‘race to the bottom’ in taxation is 
overwhelmingly viewed as a lose-lose game for governments.  In this sense it is often 
portrayed as a prisoner’s dilemma.  If all states maintain high tax rates, they each retain 
high government revenue and there is no tax-motivated movement of capital between 
states.  However, without an agreement between states to cooperate, all are at risk of 
having their high tax rates undercut by another government, thereby losing both revenue 
and capital.  Further, if all governments attempt to compete by cutting their tax rates, 
they will all lose government revenue yet none of them will gain any new capital.131  
From a neoliberal institutionalist perspective, the solution is clear – to protect their 
collective interests, states should cooperate through an institution that will provide some 
assurance that its members will not cheat.   
 
Constructivists challenge this explanation of globalisation as the structural cause of 
aligned state interests.  Sharman argues that this structural explanation of globalisation 
as an uncontrollable force eroding the economic and political sovereignty of states is in 
fact a normative discourse rather than an objective fact.  The of agency states in 
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formulating ideas is what establishes this discourse and these entrenched assumptions 
become self-fulfilling in their logic.132  Sharman contends that this view of globalisation 
was adhered to and promoted by the OECD Secretariat, and also aligned with the beliefs 
of national policy-makers. Therefore the normative framework of globalisation as 
‘Prometheus Unbound’133  informed the interpretation of state interests so that states 
became convinced of the need for a coordinated response to tax competition.134 
 
However, the constructivists overstate the extent to which states have been agents in the 
processes of globalisation.  While governments are responsible for trade liberalisation 
policies and the development or adoption of international finance laws, the 
technological developments that enabled them were largely produced by non-state 
actors.  In addition, the exponential rate of transformative change adds weight to the 
argument that even if states were responsible for the initiation of globalisation; they 
have since lost control of the consequences.   
 
Although governments such as those of Thatcher and Reagan had liberalised their 
economic markets a decade or so earlier, the extent to which globalisation had 
mobilised capital was not realised until the mid-1990s.135 Some have put its value in the 
range of $5-7 trillion US dollars, 136 but even today the extent to which capital is held 
offshore can only be roughly estimated.   
 
Of course, not all capital held offshore represents tax evasion.  But once again, the 
portion of offshore capital held by tax havens is largely unknown.  Murphy suggests 
that as much as 60% of world trade is in fact only notional and is undertaken solely to 
redirect profit from where it is earned to where it will be accounted for.137 This may be 
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for reasons other than to reduce taxation, but tax savings are frequently a key motivator.  
Palan cites estimates that range up to as much of half of the world’s capital either 
residing in or passing through tax havens.138  Despite the lack of certainty in these 
estimates, it is clear that the scale of the capital being redirected via tax havens is far 
from negligible.  It is also clear that the presence of this capital has made tax havens 
wealthier.  Between 1982 and 1999, the GDP of tax haven states reportedly grew at a 
rate of 3.3 percent compared to 1.4 percent for the rest of the world in that same 
period.139 
 
Collective interests 
The OECD is often referred to as a “country club” because of its almost uniformly high-
wealth membership.  It is also overwhelming Western in its cultural make-up and its 
members are homogenously democratic in their governance.  Its member-states have 
large public sectors with correspondingly high levels of government expenditure.  
Therefore the OECD member-states predominantly apply high tax rates and their 
citizens account for the vast majority of tax haven customers.  These common features 
of the individual states lend themselves to the close alignment of those states’ interests. 
 
In its 1998 Harmful Tax Competition report, the OECD argued that tax havens exploited 
the high tax rates of other countries by developing tax policies aimed at diverting 
mobile capital.  In doing, tax havens distorted patterns of trade and investment and 
reduced the overall global welfare.  This forced all states to alter their taxation systems, 
if not by reducing rates then by shifting taxation away from capital to depend more 
heavily on less mobile sources such as labour and consumption.  This would make 
taxation less equitable, reducing the ability of socialist states to redistribute wealth and 
would potentially have a negative impact on employment. 140   
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The scale of tax haven activity became known at a time when most OECD governments 
needed to reduce their budget deficits.  By seeking to enforce existing tax laws against 
those avoiding them in tax havens, governments could reduce the need for unpopular 
cuts to public spending or even more unpopular increases in tax rates.141 
 
But there are jurisdictional limits to the state apparatus in seeking to enforce its tax laws, 
which prevents it from stopping its citizens from benefiting from the laws of tax haven 
states.  An alternative measure might be for the individual state to alter the taxation of 
its residents in a way that neutralises the effect of revenue lost to havens, however, in a 
globalised economy this would put businesses in that state at a competitive 
disadvantage vis-à-vis other states.  Enforcing counter measures would also impose 
significant administrative costs on the state and compliance costs on taxpayers.142 
 
The benefit to havens in attracting customers was much less than the value lost in both 
capital and revenue to the states whose citizens utilised tax havens.  The havens usually 
gained very little in revenue terms because they generally did not levy taxes; rather any 
revenue raised would be collected from small licensing or set-up fees.  These fees 
would usually be just “the smallest fraction” of what the higher-taxing state would be 
losing.143  Havens would also benefit from capital being relocated to their economies, 
although it was not always necessary to physically move the capital – rather it could be 
notionally redirected.  The party that benefited most from tax havens was the investor – 
either as an individual or as a shareholder – who received a greater return.  Therefore 
among all the world’s governments, there was a loss in absolute terms caused by the use 
of tax havens.144   
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The fact that the tax haven problem exhibited prisoner’s dilemma characteristics meant 
that unilateral or bilateral solutions would not be effective.  It required a multilateral 
approach with the support of all the world’s major economies. 145   
 
The tax havens issue first gained prominence at a multilateral level at the G7  
Ministerial Summit in May 1996.  In the Summit’s official Communiqué, the Ministers 
called upon the OECD to “develop measures to counter the distorting effects of harmful 
tax competition on investment and financing decisions and the consequences for 
national tax bases, and report back in 1998”.  In response to this request, the OECD’s 
Committee on Fiscal Affairs launched its project on harmful tax competition.146 
 
Later that year, the G7 Heads of State Summit was held in Lyon. 147  The Summit’s 
official Communiqué endorsed the statements made by the G7 Ministers and stated that: 
“[G]lobalisation is creating new challenges in the field of tax policy. Tax 
schemes aimed at attracting financial and other geographically mobile activities 
can create harmful tax competition between States, carrying risks of distorting 
trade and investment and could lead to the erosion of national tax bases. We 
strongly urge the OECD to vigorously pursue its work in this field, aimed at 
establishing a multilateral approach under which countries could operate 
individually and collectively to limit the extent of these practices.”148 
 
A former Special Advisor to the US Treasury Secretary has revealed that the G7 
deliberately chose to avoid working through the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the 
UN or any other organisation with open membership. This is because they wanted to 
avoid lengthy negotiations and did not want to compromise on solutions.  It was also 
feared that the G7 states could be easily outvoted in other forums.  It was considered 
that it would be much more effective for the world’s most powerful states to design a 
new set of rules which could then be imposed in a ‘top-down’ manner at a global 
level.149   
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From a neoliberal perspective, this admission implies that a campaign against tax 
havens might not have been in the interests of less economically powerful states.  If 
states are rational and cooperate only where it is in their interests to do so, it would 
logically follow that states would not vote in support of a multilateral framework which 
went against their interests.  In a similar way, the G7 states were rational to choose to 
work within an institution that served its collective interests in order to maximise the 
benefits they would receive from the campaign rather than to situate it within an 
organisation that served a wider range of interests.  Tax havens were a collective 
problem for OECD countries and collective action against havens could be expected to 
result in absolute gains for OECD states. 
 
The OECD campaign against Harmful Tax Competition 
The OECD issued its first report, Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue, 
in April 1998.  The report contained a definitive classification of what constituted a tax 
haven.  The four elements that identify a tax haven are collectively: 
1. No or nominal taxation; 
2. No substantial activities; 
3. Lack of effective information exchange; and 
4. Lack of legal transparency. 150 
These elements have already been discussed above and so require no further explanation 
here.  
 
Tax havens were just one of two types of harmful tax competition addressed by the 
report.  Harmful preferential regimes (providing special concessions for foreigners, not 
available to domestic investors, in order to attract mobile financial activities) were also 
discussed.151  The report also set out four factors for identifying harmful preferential tax 
regimes: 
1. the regime imposes a low or zero effective tax rate on the relevant income; 
2. the regime is “ring-fenced”;  
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3. the operation of the regime is non-transparent; 
4. the jurisdiction operating the regime does not effectively exchange information 
with other countries.” 152 
 
Essentially these are the same features as tax havens, but the special rules apply only in 
limited circumstances rather than being available across the board.  They were 
considered harmful because they distorted investment decisions by attracting capital that 
would most likely not locate in a particular jurisdiction without the tax advantages 
offered. 153  However, such preferential regimes were fairly commonly used by OECD 
member-states and therefore the OECD was careful to distinguish them from tax havens.  
Sharman and Mistry have noted that this was a prejudiced approach that sought to 
counter only the tax practices deemed harmful to the interests of the OECD member-
states.154 
 
Based on these criteria, 47 regimes (many within OECD countries) were identified as 
potentially harmful. 155  The report then went on to provide some guidelines for how 
states should deal with them. Member-states with preferential regimes were advised to 
refrain from adopting new measures, to review their existing measures and to remove 
the harmful features of their preferential tax regimes within 5 years (by 2003).156 
 
The report went on to recommend that a list naming the states that fulfilled the tax 
haven criteria be put together for publication within a year.  States included on this list 
could then be subjected to a framework of sanctions, to be applied bilaterally but 
coordinated across OECD countries.  The report listed a range of possible sanctions, 
including withdrawal from double taxation agreements, disallowing tax deductions for 
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activities in havens, subjecting any transactions with havens to special scrutiny and 
imposing additional charges on transactions with tax haven states. 157  
 
To prevent compliant countries from being undermined by dissenters and potentially 
losing further capital, the report endorsed a principle known as the ‘level playing field’.  
This meant that all states were meant to commit to the same standards on the same 
timetable and with the same consequences for non-compliance.158  The list of tax havens 
was also intended to encourage uniform compliance.159  
 
The 1998 report also established a Forum on Harmful Tax Practices as a subsidiary to 
the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs.  The Forum was set up to continue the OECD’s 
work against tax havens and preferential regimes.  It was tasked with seeking self-
appraisals by member-states of their own preferential tax regimes.  It also asked states 
to report on their peers and to conduct external reviews of tax havens. 160   Most 
significantly, the CFA directed the Forum to construct the list of tax havens for 
publication the following year.161 
 
The report’s recommendations were adopted by the OECD Council on 9 April 1998, to 
which Luxembourg and Switzerland abstained. 162  Significantly, Switzerland and 
Luxembourg both have strong bank secrecy laws and relatively low taxes, therefore 
they refused to be bound by the report or any work of the Forum on Harmful Tax 
Practices. 163  
 
                                                 
157
 Sharman, J.C. ‘Norms, coercion and contracting in the struggle against 'harmful' tax’ competition, 
Australian Journal of International Affairs Vol. 60, No. 1, pp. 143_/169, March 2006, p 146. 
158
 Mistry, Percy S. and J.C. Sharman. Considering the consequences: the development implications of 
initiatives on taxation, anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism, (Commonwealth 
Secretariat, London, 2008) p 173. 
159
 Sharman, J.C. ‘The bark is the bite: International organizations and blacklisting’,  Review of 
International Political Economy, Vol. 16, No. 4, October 2009, p 577. 
160
 Payne, Anthony. The Global Politics of Unequal Development, (Palgrave Macmillian: New York, 
2005) p 155. 
161
 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging 
Global Issue, 1998, p 57. 
162Ibid, p 65. 
163
 Sharman, J.C. ‘Norms, coercion and contracting in the struggle against 'harmful' tax’ competition, 
Australian Journal of International Affairs Vol. 60, No. 1, pp. 143_/169, March 2006, p 146. 
 38
Interests, reputation and “death-by-blacklisting”164 
In June 2000, the OECD Centre for Tax Policy and Administration (overseen by the 
CFA) released its first progress report on the Harmful Tax Competition project.  As had 
been promised, this report contained a list of 35 states (mostly non-OECD) as tax 
havens.  Six other states had made hasty advance commitments to reform their tax 
systems in line with OECD demands just a week before the list was published in 
exchange for their removal from the list.165 
 
The 2000 report stated that the 35 identified tax havens would face further blacklisting 
through a new list of ‘uncooperative tax havens’ if they did not commit to making the 
demanded changes by 31 July 2001. 166  States on the 2001 list of uncooperative havens 
would then be subjected to sanctions.167   The report provided a lengthy list of potential 
measures including additional taxation, targeting for audit, refusal to negotiate or apply 
bilateral tax agreements, punitive transactional charges and denial of non-essential 
economic aid.168 Such measures could be applied unilaterally according to individual 
state discretion, and coordination of such measures would be considered across the 
OECD.   
 
The majority of the named tax havens rapidly made commitments towards reform.  In 
exchange, their names were removed from the list.169  Why was it that non-OECD 
countries benefiting both from administrative revenue and economic capital by 
operating as tax havens would comply with the demands of the OECD by committing to 
cease these activities? 
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Sharman’s constructivist explanation states that by blacklisting tax havens, the OECD 
committed a “speech act” that unilaterally damaged their reputations among investors, 
thus producing pressure to comply through actual or anticipated capital flight.170  Rather 
than simply reflecting the existing reality, the OECD list in fact created a new reality: 
any state named on their blacklist was objectively a tax haven, and any state not on the 
list was not a tax haven.171  The blacklist of states that the OECD deemed to be tax 
havens named and shamed those states.  This is what caused tax havens to comply with 
the OECD’s demands, despite a lack of either inducements or sanctions.172 
 
This approach overstates the importance of state reputations while understating the 
importance of rational interest calculation.  It is clearly correct that investors responded 
to the blacklisted states by withdrawing capital.  For example, one study found that 
Barbados’ inclusion on the OECD blacklist in 2000 contributed to a drop in new 
company registrations but growth picked up in 2003 following its removal. 173  
Therefore Sharman argues that reputation matters.  However, reputation matters to 
states and to investors only to the extent that it provides basic information upon which a 
calculation of risk and likely consequences can be based.  Therefore unless there is an 
actual or anticipated material impact on a state’s interests, its reputation is irrelevant.   
 
Investment decisions by their very nature are speculative and based upon perceptions.174  
The share value of a company is prospective – it involves an educated guess about how 
well the business will do in future.  In the global financial markets, investors often make 
face-value judgements about their investments.  Reputations enable investors to quickly 
make assessments about which investments are likely to pay off, and which might be 
risky.  The reputation itself is insignificant – it is what that reputation means for the 
investors’ interests – usually defined in terms of expected profits – that matters.  A 
rational investor will look at the blacklist and the list of sanctions that the OECD has 
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recommended and factor the risk of such sanctions being carried out into their decision 
of where to invest their money.  This corresponds with the investor’s desire to maximise 
the chances of a high return and to minimise the chances of a loss.  
 
Tax havens were therefore rationally concerned with being blacklisted to the extent that 
this would affect investors’ risk assessments.  Havens were highly dependent on foreign 
investment as the basis of their economies; therefore they had a clear interest in 
attracting and retaining this investment.  It follows then that there were two categories 
of states that complied in response to blacklisting – firstly, those that reacted to material 
economic losses after investors began withdrawing and secondly, those that anticipated 
material economic loss and therefore sought to pre-empt this damage.175  The study 
mentioned above also concluded that: 
The single most important factor explaining the adoption of these new 
international standards in [Barbados, Mauritius and Vanuatu] has been fear of 
the consequences of being blacklisted by international organisations in the event 
of non-compliance.176 
This illustrates behaviour responsive to a logic of consequences, not a logic of 
appropriateness. 
 
It was reported that growth of Mauritius’ international financial services industry stalled 
even before it had been blacklisted, in response to publication of the Harmful Tax 
Competition report in April 1998.177  This report did not name Mauritius as a tax haven 
and therefore it could not be said to have unilaterally changed its reputation.  However, 
it could be logically concluded that investors assessed Mauritius as a likely candidate 
for defensive measures imposed by OECD countries and therefore were reluctant to 
increase their investment in a risky jurisdiction.  
 
Various sources have named Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Ecuador, France, Indonesia, 
Italy, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Venezuela and the 
United States as having their own national blacklists of tax havens in their domestic tax 
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legislation. 178   Although these blacklists may have been influenced by the OECD 
blacklist, they do not completely align with it.  Notably, these states have not followed 
the OECD in removing havens from their list following commitments towards action.179    
These national blacklists provide a basis for distinguished tax treatment and/or scrutiny 
under domestic tax law. But regardless of whether a state has published a formal list, 
most tax authorities pay special attention to transactions involving low-tax territories.180 
 
Many major international banks have established their own informal blacklists as part of 
due diligence.  The names of listed jurisdictions may be included as terms on private 
software designed to trigger enhanced scrutiny.181  The result of extra scrutiny is usually 
a decline in share prices.182  Transactions with some jurisdictions have been perceived 
to be more trouble than they are worth, with many major international banks now 
refusing to process transactions involving havens such as Vanuatu.  In such cases, 
domestic banks are forced to replace their correspondent banking relationships.  As with 
the national blacklists, private blacklists have often not been updated following a state’s 
removal from the OECD list.183   Therefore, in addition to the harm caused to a state by 
the withdrawal of capital and decline in government revenue, it is often also costly for 
states to campaign for removal from the various blacklists.184 
 
However, not all tax havens responded to blacklisting by the OECD.  Liechtenstein is a 
key state that was repeatedly included on the OECD lists but consistently refused to 
cooperate.185  Sharman’s research found public and private sector officials to be frank in 
acknowledging that the state’s low tax rates combined with secrecy laws were the 
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primary attractions for foreign investors.186  This illustrates a rational calculation of 
interests in which the cost of compliance with OECD demands was determined to be 
higher than the cost of non-compliance. 187   Liechtenstein consistently remained 
immovable despite damage to its reputation,188 instead acting in accordance with its 
economic interests.  If damage to a state’s reputation was the key to compliance with 
OECD standards, then this cannot explain why some states, such as Liechtenstein, did 
not comply. 
 
The states that complied with the OECD demands following blacklisting were 
invariably small, developing states with little to continue to attract investment in the 
absence of tax advantages.  Whilst larger financial centres such as Liechtenstein’s and 
Switzerland’s are able to weather financial scandals and survive relatively unscathed, 
small, developing financial centres may never recover from a severe financial shock.189  
Therefore it would seem that despite the high cost of compliance, the material costs of 
non-compliance were higher for the states that conformed to OECD standards.  
Although blacklisting may have damaged states’ reputations, this could not be said to be 
the reason for their compliance.  Instead there is clear evidence of states’ rational 
calculations of interests consistent with a logic of consequences. 
 
Harmful Tax Competition to Harmful Tax Practices 
The OECD’s next Progress Report published in November 2001 contained substantial 
modifications that had the effect of drastically reducing the scope of the project against 
tax havens.  The most significant changes were as follows: 
 
1. The OECD would no longer pursue states on the basis of no substantial activities 
and it clarified that it had never considered no or low taxation in isolation as 
warranting classification of a state as a tax haven.  Therefore two of the four 
criteria it had included in the definition of a tax haven were effectively removed 
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from the scope of the project.  Instead it would only pursue commitments from 
states with respect to transparency and effective information exchange;  
 
2. Sanctions (referred to by the OECD as “coordinated defensive measures”) would 
no longer apply to non-OECD uncooperative tax havens any earlier than they 
would to OECD members with harmful preferential regimes (timetabled for 
April 2003);190 
 
3. The 31 July 2001 deadline for making commitments towards reform (which had 
passed without mention) was deferred until 28 February 2002.  The time for 
jurisdictions to develop implementation plans was also extended from six to 
twelve months after the date of making their commitment; 
 
4. The time states that had made commitments were given to develop 
implementation plans was extended from six months to twelve;191  
 
Despite removing two of the four criteria of a tax haven from the scope of the OECD 
project, the Report was careful to note that these modifications did not alter the fact that 
the original four factors were all relevant to defining a tax haven in accordance with the 
1998 Report.  Therefore instead of being ‘uncooperative tax havens’, future lists would 
refer only to ‘uncommitted jurisdictions’.192    
 
The most crucial change was the abandonment of the substantial activities criterion.  
The criterion meant that tax havens were required to stop offering tax benefits to 
investors that did not conduct substantial business in the tax haven.  By removing this, 
the OECD abandoned the attempt to force tax havens to actually change their tax 
systems.193  In addition, states that had already made commitments prior to the 2001 
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Report were allowed to review these commitments in respect of the no substantial 
activity criterion.   
 
The report went on to say that the OECD would continue to welcome removal of 
practices connected with the no substantial activities criterion despite the fact that it 
would no longer pursue this.194  The fact that the OECD maintained that these practices 
were harmful while indicating that it would not pursue them indicates that the OECD 
was defeated, at least on this point.  
 
All that now remained within the scope of the OECD project was that it could continue 
to put pressure on havens to agree to share information when requested by foreign tax 
authorities. 195  This would require that secrecy laws be dealt with in such a way that the 
requested information could be both collected and disclosed.  
 
Although the deadline for commitments was extended, it is significant that the 2001 
Report made no mention of what would happen on that date other than to say that no 
blacklist would be required if all states made commitments towards effective 
information exchange prior to the expiration of the deadline.  In addition, it could have 
been expected that the 28 February deadline would not be strictly enforced because the 
Committee on Fiscal Affairs was not due to meet again until May 2002, which would be 
the first opportunity to discuss any sanctions.196 
 
Very little attempt was made to explain why the project was so dramatically scaled back.  
In its press release, the OECD simply stated that “The changes were made in response 
to the dialogue that has taken place.” 197   The report itself gave little additional 
information, disclosing only that some member-states and some tax havens had 
expressed concerns regarding the no substantial activities criterion and the application 
                                                 
194
 Inland Revenue Department (New Zealand). ‘OECD Report on Tax Havens Released’, published 15 
November 2001, online at http://taxpolicy.ird.govt.nz/news/2001-11-15-oecd-report-tax-havens-
released#release accessed 01/04/2010.  
195
 Webb, Michael C. ‘Defining the Boundaries of Legitimate State Practice: Norms, Transnational Actors 
and the OECD’s Project on Harmful Tax Competition’, Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 
11, No. 4, October 2004, p 816. 
196
 Meeting date obtained on the basis of the author’s employment with New Zealand’s Inland Revenue 
Department. 
197
 Inland Revenue Department (New Zealand). ‘OECD Report on Tax Havens Released’, published 15 
November 2001, online at http://taxpolicy.ird.govt.nz/news/2001-11-15-oecd-report-tax-havens-
released#release accessed 01/04/2010.  
 45
of co-ordinated defensive measures to tax havens.198  In addition to Luxembourg and 
Switzerland’s abstentions which carried through from the initial report, Belgium and 
Portugal abstained on the 2001 Report.199     
 
An additional change was that the name of the project was changed from Harmful Tax 
Competition to Harmful Tax Practices.  This change was not directly acknowledged in 
the Report, however there was a notable shift in rhetoric with the Report stating that: 
[T]he OECD seeks to promote tax competition that will achieve the overall aims 
of the OECD to foster economic growth and development world-wide. The 
OECD project does not seek to dictate to any country what its tax rate should be, 
or how its tax system should be structured. It seeks to encourage an environment 
in which free and fair tax competition can take place.200 
 
Angel Gurria, the current OECD Secretary-General, later addressed this point in an 
interview in 2009:   
One of our capital principles is the free-flow of capital. In the OECD we have a 
set of mandatory, binding principles, a key part of our armoury of capital, that 
promote the free-flow of capital, the best practices, actually recommend the free-
flow of capital. That is not the question. The capital can flow freely; the question 
is disclosures for purposes of every tax authority just doing their homework.201 
 
Much has been made of this rhetorical change.  An OECD official was quoted by The 
Economist magazine in September 2000 as saying, with reference to the then Harmful 
Tax Competition campaign: “As an economist, how can you ever say anything bad 
about competition?”202  This drew attention to the internal contradiction between the 
principles of free-market capitalism, upon which the OECD was founded, and its 
contentions through its Harmful Tax Competition project that tax competition could be 
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harmful and should be eliminated.203  As has been discussed above, there is a significant 
viewpoint that aligns with dominant liberal economic beliefs that views tax competition 
as a healthy way to prevent government inefficiencies.204 
 
Sharman and Webb have both explained this as a normative weakness that eroded the 
OECD’s legitimacy.205  By preaching one thing while practicing another, the OECD put 
itself in a position where states with a real motivation to defect from their earlier 
commitments could claim the OECD was hypocritical.  These states would then be able 
to excuse themselves from their commitments without damaging their own reputations, 
because the organisation holding them to their pledges had lost its credibility.  Sharman 
has termed this as “rhetorical self-entrapment.”206 
 
Sharman and Webb agree that the haven states exploited this contradiction by 
employing the normative arguments of the OECD in a “mimetic challenge”207 within 
other organisations (such as the Commonwealth, the Caribbean Community and the 
Pacific Islands Forum) and to powerful OECD states, in particular the United States.  
Sharman explains that havens were able to do this because “the irreducible plurality of 
meanings in language can sometimes enable the weak to use the principles of the strong 
for their own subversive ends.”208  In this way, havens managed to persuade OECD 
member-states that the OECD’s framing of the campaign was inconsistent with liberal 
economic theory in addition to norms of fairness, sovereignty and multilateralism.209   
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The emphasis of this approach is on the resonance of the normative arguments put 
forward by tax havens with those who held the power to change the OECD project.  The 
constructivists argue that tax havens succeeded at their cause because they appealed to 
norms that had already been accepted as a framework for appropriate behaviour at the 
international level.210  These norms shaped expectations of appropriate behaviour that 
partly constituted the OECD’s identity. 211   So by acting to coerce the havens’ 
compliance through blacklisting, the OECD acted against both what was expected of it 
and what defined its own reputation.212   By drawing attention to the fact that the OECD 
was not behaving appropriately, its legitimacy as the arbiter of whether individual states 
were living up to those same standards was worn away.  The OECD was unable to 
continue with its project in its existing format because the credibility of the campaign 
had been lost.213   
 
The OECD was forced not only to dramatically scale back the scope of the project, but 
to go further and change the project’s title and associated rhetoric.  Sharman and Webb 
argue that the OECD’s inconsistent and defensive reaction clearly shows that the tax 
havens’ framing of the campaign as hypocritical was successful not just among the 
OECD member-states that called for the changes, but also within the OECD institution 
itself.214  
 
Once again, this approach largely ignores the interests of the states involved in the 
project.  From the perspective of the OECD as an institution separate from other states 
(and the extent to which it acts independently of state interests has already been 
questioned), the OECD was able to preserve the life of its campaign against tax havens 
by shifting the rhetoric to persuade havens that their voices had been heard, but yet at 
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the same time, the end result of the project would still be the same.  The OECD agreed 
to no longer target the tax regimes of havens, but instead it would intensify its efforts to 
force the havens to provide information on those using them.  The goal in doing this 
was to allow OECD member-states to convict their residents of tax evasion and thereby 
deter others from using tax havens in future.  Without customers, tax havens would be 
forced to change their strategies.   
 
In addition, when the domestic tax laws of the havens were the primary focus of the 
OECD campaign, the havens were able to make arguments in terms of sovereignty and 
non-interference.  Once the focus shifted to secrecy, OECD states could instead utilise 
these same norms to advance its interests by arguing that the havens were using secrecy 
to undermine the domestic tax laws of OECD states.215   
 
By changing the title of the project and its associated rhetoric, the OECD framed the 
way in which tax havens viewed the campaign.  Then the OECD could continue to 
make progress towards its original goals but this time with the implicit support of tax 
havens.  From this perspective, the OECD used norms as a tool towards achieving the 
goals that its member-states had set in accordance with their collective interests.  
 
From the perspective of individual member-states, there is even stronger evidence of 
rational interest calculation as the driver behind the change in the OECD’s normative 
rhetoric.  The United States was undoubtedly the driving force behind the 2001 changes 
to the OECD campaign and this can be explained by domestic pressures existing at the 
time of the George W. Bush Administration.  In addition, the OECD’s campaign against 
tax havens went indisputably against the interests of the havens, which did everything 
they could to lobby for their interests within other international institutions.  To some 
extent, tax havens did find ready ears among certain OECD member-states that were 
persuaded that some aspects of the OECD campaign were not in the interests of the 
member-states themselves.  The interests of the United States, the tax havens and other 
OECD member-states will be discussed in turn below, with the conclusion that the 
OECD will ultimately favour whichever norms suit the interests of its most powerful 
member-states. 
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Domestic lobbying and United States interests  
The fact that pro-tax haven arguments had a significant support base within the United 
States has already been alluded to.  This reality needs to first be placed within its 
context before it can be further explained.  
 
The OECD project against tax havens was born under the presidency of Bill Clinton, a 
Democrat who was thought to represent the interests of lower and middle-income voters 
and who held power during a time of relative fiscal restraint.  It was in this context that 
the United States offered its initial strong support for the Harmful Tax Competition 
initiative.216   
 
Clinton was followed by the Republican Administration of George W. Bush, a president 
renowned for representing business interests and the principles of liberal economics.  In 
addition, Bush was sceptical of cooperation with multilateral institutions, and at the 
time of the changes to the OECD Project in 2001, the United States was enjoying a 
period of rapid economic growth.   
 
These two presidents clearly represented different domestic interest groups and 
perceived what was in the United State’s interests very differently.  In addition, changes 
within the United States’ fiscal climate occurred between these presidencies and would 
have had a bearing on how US interests were determined.  
 
The pro-tax haven rhetoric came almost exclusively from within the Republican 
movement in the United States.   Webb states that “the Republican Administration was 
ideologically predisposed to accept the critiques of the right-wing coalition that had 
formed in the US to oppose the [OECD Harmful Tax Competition] project.”217  In 
keeping with the constructivist school of thought, Webb implies that the Republican 
Administration listened to its lobbyists because of the normative resonance of its 
arguments.  Although not himself a constructivist, Payne has agreed that lobbyists 
during this period were able to effectively play upon the conventional low tax 
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convictions of most American Republicans. 218   While a neoliberal approach might 
concede that within the domestic realm, state interests are to some extent perceived in 
accordance with ideology, it would emphasise that the Republican Administration was 
more likely to have been motivated by its core constituency’s interests and its own 
interests in being re-elected.   
 
The coalition that Webb refers to includes right-wing think tanks such as the Center for 
Freedom and Prosperity (CFP), the Cato Institute and the Heritage Foundation.  The 
CFP was said to have been the leader of the movement and was formed in 2000 with the 
specific intention of countering the OECD project on Harmful Tax Competition.  The 
CFP lobbied the US Congress, the Bush Administration and sought support directly 
from tax havens.219  The CFP was known to have been in particularly close contact with 
Caribbean governments.220 
 
Sharman and Webb have both focused on the ideology and norms that the CFP 
perpetuated as being the key to its success in persuading the US government and foreign 
governments to withdraw their support for the OECD project.  Webb describes the CFP 
as “libertarian anti-tax”, “anti-government” and “deeply suspicious of European welfare 
states.”221  Sharman states that the CFP portrayed the OECD campaign as an attempt by 
socialist governments to establish a “global tax police.”222  
 
It appears that rather than making any particular normative argument, the CFP used a 
range of alternative arguments depending on its audience and displayed a willingness to 
use whichever argument would be most effective at furthering its cause.  When 
addressing tax havens, the CFP made arguments in terms of sovereignty and non-
intervention.  It gained support from the Congressional Black Caucus by characterising 
the OECD project as harmful to poor developing neighbours.  In other circles it argued 
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directly that the OECD project went against US interests.223  Aspects of US federal and 
state taxation were presented as at risk of being categorised as harmful by the OECD. 224  
It was even argued that the US itself met the OECD definition of a tax haven and 
therefore would be targeted by the OECD campaign.  It was also stated that US 
investors benefitted from the use of other tax havens and that it would harm US 
business interests if the havens were abolished.225  
 
In addition to the right-wing think tanks, transnational banks and tax advisors also 
voiced their strong opposition to the OECD campaign.  The industry argued that a 
crackdown on tax havens would severely hurt their businesses and that they should not 
be restricted from engaging in international tax planning.  These private firms had 
significant political influence as lobbyists with connections to finance and treasury 
departments throughout OECD member-states. 226   Further, the key clients of these 
banks and tax practitioners were big businesses who stood to face increased effective 
taxation abroad as a result of the OECD project.  It is likely that many of these large 
multinationals had similar connections to the US government as the tax service industry. 
 
The US government reflected both normative arguments and national interest arguments 
when it publically announced its change of position.  On 10 May 2001, US Treasury 
Secretary Paul O’Neill stated: 
I am troubled by the underlying premise that low tax rates are somehow suspect 
and by the notion that any country, or group of countries, should interfere in any 
other country's decision about how to structure its own tax system. I also am 
concerned about the potentially unfair treatment of some non-OECD countries.  
The United States does not support efforts to dictate to any country what its own 
tax rates or tax system should be, and will not participate in any initiative to 
harmonize world tax systems.227  
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The normative arguments regarding sovereignty, non-intervention and the right to 
development clearly are not ones that had absolute and inherent resonance with the 
Bush Administration and the Republican Party.  Webb admits that the apparent 
sympathy for the unfair treatment of non-OECD states “can only be seen as a 
rationalisation for policy driven by other concerns, since the US is an enthusiastic 
proponent of using international institutions like the IMF to ‘dictate’ other kinds of 
economic policy in developing countries.” 228   Norms of sovereignty and non-
interference have demonstrably been drawn upon by the US government where they 
have been perceived to serve US interests and blatantly ignored where they were not.  It 
therefore appears that the US government has used norms in the present case just as it 
has in others as tools to further its rational pursuit of the national interest.  
 
O’Neill went on to discuss US interests in relation to the OECD project: 
The United States simply has no interest in stifling the competition that forces 
governments - like businesses - to create efficiencies.  In fact, the 
Administration is actively working to lower tax rates for all Americans.229 
Clearly, the OECD project in its format at that time no longer aligned with the policy 
goals and perceived national interests of the US government.  O’Neill directly 
confirmed this, stating that “In its current form, the project is too broad and it is not in 
line with this Administration's tax and economic priorities.”230    
 
O’Neill then clearly defined the aspects of the project that did support US interests.  He 
stated that the US needed information from tax havens in order to prosecute its own 
citizens for tax evasion and therefore the key issue it wanted to see the OECD address 
was secrecy.   In “appropriate circumstances”, organisations “like the OECD” could be 
used to build a framework for information exchange.  He emphasised that “Where we 
share common goals, we will continue to work with our G7 partners to achieve these 
goals,” specifically calling for the OECD initiative to be refocused on “our common 
goal” of information exchange.   
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Despite the adoption of normative arguments in the first part of O’Neill’s speech, a 
clear emphasis is given to the fact that the OECD project no longer aligned with US 
interests.  This suggests that rather than following a logic of what was appropriate, the 
normative arguments served to advance rationally calculated interests.  In withdrawing 
its support for the OECD Harmful Tax Competition project, the United States acted in 
accordance with a logic of the likely consequences. 
 
There is little debate surrounding the extent to which the US was responsible for the 
shift in the OECD project.  Murphy, Webb, Nicodeme and Payne have all attributed the 
changes directly to pressure from the United States.231 Webb points to the fact that all 
that remained of the OECD project following these comments from the US were exactly 
the elements that the US had deemed acceptable – transparency and information 
exchange.232  Payne has added that “the antipathy of the US government did more to 
check the progress of the OECD initiative than any amount of hostility from Barbados 
and other listed countries.”233 
 
Bearing this in mind, the secondary role of tax havens in shaping the changes to the 
Harmful Tax Competition project will be discussed below.  
 
The tax haven lobby 
It requires no great leap of logic to accept that the OECD Harmful Tax Competition 
project went directly against the interests of tax havens.  Tax havens by their very nature 
have little domestic investment and few attractions for foreign investors aside from the 
tax advantages they offer.  Tax concessions for foreigners are at the very centre of their 
economic strategies.  Therefore in the absence of such tax advantages, they would most 
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likely be driven out of the market for financial services with disastrous consequences 
for their economies.234   
 
Some of the havens went so far as to argue that the OECD campaign sought not only to 
recover capital and tax revenue by eliminating the havens, but that it also sought to 
remove competition for its financial centres such as London, New York and Tokyo that 
stood to attract the former clients of tax havens.235 
 
Tax havens began lobbying within their regional groupings, most notably in the 
Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Pacific Island Forum (PIF). 236  A 
significant proportion of the members of each of these institutions had been blacklisted 
by the OECD; therefore it was in the collective interests of these institutions to take up 
the tax havens’ cause. 
  
Seven Pacific Island states had been blacklisted in 2000 and it was claimed that the 
income these states received from their offshore financial sectors amounted to as much 
as eight to ten percent of their GDP.237  These states lobbied through the PIF which in 
turn demanded compensation from OECD members for the business that would be lost 
to its members’ economies as a result of their compliance with OECD standards.238  A 
wider conference of Pacific states was held in Japan in February 2001, including 
representatives from the Commonwealth Secretariat, and this was followed by a joint 
OECD-Pacific Islands Forum meeting held in Fiji in April 2001.239 
 
Commonwealth tax havens took their case to the Commonwealth Finance Ministers 
meeting in September 2000.240  The result of this meeting was an official statement 
from the Commonwealth criticising the Harmful Tax Competition campaign as partial, 
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coercive and an infringement of the principle of non-intervention.  The Secretary-
General of the Commonwealth then invited the OECD to co-sponsor a meeting to be 
held in Barbados in January 2001. 241   The resulting joint OECD-Commonwealth 
meeting had over 160 participants including 13 OECD countries, 13 Caribbean states, 5 
Pacific Island states and representatives of CARICOM and the PIF.242   
 
As a result of these meetings and with help from the Commonwealth, CARICOM and 
the PIF established the International Tax and Investment Organisation (ITIO) to 
coordinate their lobby against the OECD campaign.243  The ITIO has been credited with 
persuading certain OECD members to alter their positions on the OECD campaign.   In 
early 2001, Australia, Canada and New Zealand, each Commonwealth states with close 
links to developing blacklisted states (Australia and New Zealand with the Pacific and 
Canada with the Caribbean) urged the OECD to look for cooperative solutions rather 
than using sanctions that would destabilise already fragile economies.244 
 
The constructivists have argued that tax havens managed to persuade not only these 
three countries but also the United States of the normative value of their case.  Sharman 
claims that: 
Small states secured a key victory in persuading the United States to defect from 
the OECD campaign in May 2001....After a period of initial indecision, the Bush 
Administration became convinced by the rhetoric of the tax havens and their 
supporters.245 
 
This argument ignores the fundamental interests of both the tax havens and the states 
they are said to have persuaded.  Firstly, it has been clearly established that the OECD 
campaign went directly against the rationally-conceived interests of tax havens.  Many 
of the arguments made by the havens when lobbying other institutions and states were 
made directly in the terms of their calculated interests.  The normative arguments 
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therefore can be seen in a context where the underlying driver remained state interests, 
and as such, the norms were merely tools used to advance those interests.    
 
Secondly, it seems unlikely that the most powerful state in the world could be persuaded 
to change its approach solely on the basis of normative arguments from self-interested 
backwater states.  Had the tax havens’ cause not happened to have aligned with the 
causes of the financial services industry, big business and the right-wing lobbyists 
within the US, it is unlikely that the US government would have paid them any attention.  
The domestic lobby within the US is the more likely candidate for successfully 
persuading the US government to reassess its interests with respect to the Harmful Tax 
Competition campaign.  Once the US government came to perceive the OECD 
campaign as no longer according with its interests, its interests had aligned with those of 
tax havens.  This alignment of interests is what explains the alignment of rhetoric 
employed by both the tax havens and the US. 
 
The way in which the OECD rapidly responded by redefining the goals of its campaign 
against tax havens illustrates the neoliberal contention that institutions will adapt in 
accordance with the shifting collective interests of its member-states.  By also altering 
its normative rhetoric in line with that used by the United States, it revealed that the 
OECD will ultimately favour whichever norms suit the interests of its most powerful 
member-states. 
 
Secrecy and decline 
In accordance with the 2001 Progress Report, the OECD shifted its focus to 
transparency and information exchange.  This approach sought to enable OECD 
member-states to enforce their domestic tax laws rather than requiring tax havens to 
change their tax systems. 
 
A ‘Global Forum on Taxation’ had been established with little fanfare in 2000 by a 
group of 32 states in support of the OECD Harmful Tax Competition campaign.  This 
Forum became the new centre of discussions on how non-OECD countries might be 
assessed for compliance with the OECD’s exchange of information (EOI) standards.    
The OECD’s Model Convention on Double Taxation contained an article on EOI 
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(Article 26), which provided a basis for bilateral Double Taxation Agreement (DTA) 
negotiations.  However, DTAs were not an appropriate medium for tax havens to 
commit to information exchange, because DTAs are only entered into where there is 
double taxation requiring relief.  High-tax states would not wish to enter into an 
agreement to reduce their taxing rights in cross-border situations when the other state 
does not levy any taxes.  To resolve this issue, the Global Forum on Taxation designed 
a Model Agreement on Exchange of Information on Tax Matters in 2002, providing a 
basis for bilateral agreements relating solely to tax information exchange.  Agreements 
that were later negotiated from this model became known as Tax Information Exchange 
Agreements (TIEAs).246 However, while high-tax states were motivated to enter into 
DTAs for the mutual benefits they afforded, TIEAs were of no advantage to tax havens 
except that signing on to them would ensure they did not face any future OECD 
sanctions.   
 
The EOI article in the OECD Model Tax Convention and the new Model Agreement on 
Exchange of Information on Tax Matters were endorsed by G20 Finance Ministers at 
their Berlin Meeting in 2004 as the internationally agreed standard by which to assess 
effective information exchange. 247  The standard provides that information must be 
exchanged between states on request where it is “foreseeably relevant” to enforcement 
of the treaty partner’s tax laws.  It also requires that states have the power to obtain the 
requested information from those operating in its jurisdiction in a reliable way.   The 
EOI standard also provides that information may not be denied on the basis of banking 
secrecy laws or because the provider has no interest of its own in the requested 
information.  Finally, there must be strict confidentiality of information exchanged.248 
 
Most of the remaining blacklisted tax havens made commitments towards the OECD 
transparency and information exchange standards after the initiative was scaled back, 
and by April 2002 when the OECD published its new list of ‘uncommitted jurisdictions’, 
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only seven names remained (Andorra, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Monaco, the Marshall 
Islands, Nauru and Vanuatu).  Nauru and Vanuatu were later removed in 2003 and 
Liberia and the Marshall islands were removed in 2007, leaving just three states 
(Andorra, Liechtenstein and Monaco).249  
 
Webb argues that this willingness to cooperate reflected the fact that the OECD’s 
conditions were no longer onerous.250  Tax havens could continue to offer tax breaks to 
foreign investors so long as they committed to sign on to TIEAs.  A commitment was 
enough to be removed from the list and while many havens did negotiate a number of 
bilateral TIEAs, very few were actually signed and brought into legal effect.251  What is 
more, the havens had been assured that they would not be subject to sanctions if they 
failed to keep their commitments until such a time as the OECD was willing and able to 
apply the same sanctions to Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg and Switzerland who 
continued to veto the OECD project.  The immovable positions of these four key OECD 
states led observers to believe that “the OECD juggernaut” had effectively “ground to a 
halt” 252 and that OECD was unlikely to ever achieve its stated goal of a ‘level playing 
field’.253   
 
What happened in 2008-09? 
The stalemate that had existed from the time of the OECD’s 2001 Progress Report 
ended dramatically in 2008 in the wake of the global financial crisis (GFC).   The GFC 
had reached its peak in September 2008 with the collapse, takeover or bailout of 
financial institutions such as Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch and AIG.  
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On 15 November 2008, the G20 held a Summit on Financial Markets and the World 
Economy in Washington.  Led by the United Kingdom and France, the Summit was 
intended to address some of the key causes of the GFC.  On the agenda was the role of 
international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
regulation of financial markets, monetary policy and recapitalisation of multinational 
banks. 254   The Summit was referred to by the media as ‘Bretton Woods II’255 because it 
was hoped it would result in significant reforms to the global financial system.256  
 
The G20 – OECD alliance 
 
The G20 Washington Summit has been credited with initiating a strong political 
impetus to tackle tax evasion.257  The Washington Summit Declaration by G20 leaders 
stated that the G20 was committed to promoting “information sharing, including with 
respect to jurisdictions that have yet to commit to international standards with respect to 
bank secrecy and transparency.” 258   The G20 also outlined an ‘Action Plan to 
Implement Principles for Reform’ stating that:   
Tax authorities, drawing upon the work of relevant bodies such as the OECD, 
should continue efforts to promote tax information exchange.  Lack of 
transparency and a failure to exchange tax information should be vigorously 
addressed. 259  
 
It is now clear that there was a dramatic revival of the OECD campaign in the months 
that followed, although the OECD made no public announcements regarding its work 
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until immediately prior to the next G20 Summit in London on 2 April 2009.  In one 
remarkable week in March of 2009, Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg and Switzerland all 
dramatically withdrew their reservations to Article 26 (Exchange of Information) of the 
OECD Model Tax Convention.260  This was a major breakthrough for the OECD project, 
as there was no longer any opposition from OECD member-states.   
 
The most striking was Switzerland’s announcement, because it implied that the 
country’s century-old strict bank secrecy rules would be breached where there was 
suspected tax evasion.261  Switzerland was thought to provide shelter to at least US$1.89 
trillion of the world’s estimated US$7 trillion of private wealth262 and the removal of 
the promise of secrecy for these investments would undoubtedly harm Switzerland’s 
offshore finance sector.263   British Prime Minister Gordon Brown hailed the Swiss 
announcement as “the beginning of the end for tax havens”.264 
 
The Swiss government was open in its reluctance to concede.  The announcement was 
made following an overnight meeting with the OECD265 and Swiss officials objected 
publically to “the criticism and threats made towards Switzerland by various states in 
connection with the issue of the exchange of information in tax matters.”266  Various 
media reported that this pressure had come from the US Obama Administration and the 
European Union.267  Media reports also widely claimed that Switzerland had ultimately 
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conceded because it had learned that it was going to be included on a new blacklist of 
uncooperative tax havens being drawn up by the OECD.268 
 
How this new blacklist came to light is not clear, as it had not been announced by the 
OECD.  Some media reported that it was Swiss Ministers who leaked the 
information, 269  however the Swiss Federal Department of Finance maintains that 
“despite being a founding member of the OECD, [Switzerland] was not notified of the 
production of the list.” 270  It was widely expected that the release of the blacklist would 
be timed for the next G20 Heads of State Summit in London on 2 April 2009.271  The 
OECD denied that a blacklist was being formulated and Head of Media and Public 
Affairs and Communications Nicolas Bray stated that “There is no new ‘OECD list’ of 
tax havens and we are not quoting any specific number of tax havens.”272  However, he 
was also forced to clarify that media reports had been referring to “an information table” 
providing information on jurisdictions that currently did not conform to the 
internationally agreed standards of transparency and information.273 
 
Just days before the London Summit, French President Nicolas Sarkozy (then also 
President of the EU), revealed that negotiations were underway with Andorra to seek its 
commitment to information exchange.  Sarkozy dramatically threatened that unless 
Andorra cooperated fully, he would resign as the microstate’s co-prince. 274  He 
reportedly also told MPs of his ruling party: “I want a list of tax havens and I want to 
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punish them.” 275   Almost immediately, Andorra, in addition to Liechtenstein and 
Monaco, the only three states still remaining on the OECD’s blacklist of ‘non-
cooperative tax havens’, all endorsed the OECD standard of information exchange.276 
 
The Official Communiqué from the G20 London Summit noted that leaders agreed: 
to take action against non-cooperative jurisdictions, including tax havens. We 
stand ready to deploy sanctions to protect our public finances and financial 
systems. The era of banking secrecy is over.277 
These were the strongest words to date by political leaders in support of the OECD 
campaign.  
 
The G20 also published a supporting annex: ‘Declaration on Strengthening the 
Financial System’, containing detailed proposals to address “Tax Havens and Non-
Cooperative Jurisdictions”.278   Citing an “essential” need to protect public finances 
against non-cooperative jurisdictions, the Declaration reiterated that “We stand ready to 
take agreed action against those jurisdictions which do not meet international standards 
in relation to tax transparency.”279    It then listed a “toolbox” of effective counter 
measures for countries to consider taking against non-cooperative jurisdictions.  These 
recommended counter measures were identical in substance to those that had been 
consistently suggested by the OECD from the time of its 2000 Progress Report.  They 
included compulsory reporting of transactions involving non-cooperative jurisdictions, 
additional (withholding) taxes on transactions, disallowing tax deductions, withdrawing 
from DTAs and reconsidering provision of bilateral aid to non-cooperative jurisdictions.  
In addition, international institutions and regional development banks could be asked to 
review their investment policies with regards to non-cooperative jurisdictions.280  
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The use of the terms ‘tax haven’ and ‘non-cooperative jurisdiction’ is noteworthy 
because the OECD had made it clear from the time of the 2001 Progress Report that it 
was no longer targeting tax havens, except to the extent that they and any other states 
failed to commit to transparency and information exchange standards.  The term ‘non-
cooperative jurisdiction’ had been employed by the OECD to indicate states which had 
failed to commit to these standards.  However by the time of the London Summit, no 
states remained on the list of non-cooperative jurisdictions.  At the following G20 
Summit in Pittsburgh (discussed below), the two terms were used interchangeably and 
the latter abbreviated to ‘NCJ’.  The fact that their use no longer corresponds with the 
definitions provided by the OECD (or any other known definition) implies that they 
may be used to refer to any state that the G20 wishes.  
 
The G20 noted that on the same day as its London Summit, the OECD published ‘A 
Progress Report on the Jurisdictions Surveyed by the OECD Global Forum in 
Implementing the Internationally Agreed Tax Standard’ (the 2009 Progress Report).281  
The single-page report contained a table listing states under specific headings: 
• ‘Jurisdictions that have substantially implemented the internationally agreed tax 
standard’  (which became known as the “white list”); 
• ‘Jurisdictions that have committed to the internationally agreed tax standard, but 
have not yet substantially implemented’ (the “grey list”); which was divided into 
30 ‘Tax Havens’ and 8 ‘Other Financial Centres’(Switzerland, Singapore, 
Luxembourg, Austria, Belgium, Brunei, Chile, Guatemala).  [Although no 
explanation for the distinction was offered, it appears that the OECD had 
reverted to its 1998 definition of a tax haven and therefore the ‘other financial 
centres’ would be excluded on the basis of having substantive activities.] 
• ‘Jurisdictions that have not committed to the internationally agreed tax standard’ 
(the new “blacklist”) containing Costa Rica, Malaysia (Labuan), Philippines and 
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Uruguay.282 Upon publication of the list, these four jurisdictions immediately 
committed and were moved to the “grey list” by April 7.283   
 
The standard by which the white list was determined was simply the number of DTAs 
or TIEAs containing effective information exchange clauses that each country had 
signed.  Any state that had not signed at least 12 of these agreements was automatically 
downgraded to the grey or blacklist, depending on whether they had accepted the 
information exchange standard in principle.  
 
It is interesting to note that the Malaysian Federal Territory of Labuan is the only 
domestic jurisdiction on the list.  Its inclusion immediately draws attention to the fact 
that many such special financial jurisdictions exist, including the US state of Delaware 
and the UK island of Guernsey.  The OECD has not attempted to explain this 
discrepancy.  A neoliberal explanation would consider that the OECD exists to advance 
the collective interests of its member-states; therefore it is not surprising that powerful 
OECD members were not targeted. 
 
At the next G20 Summit in Pittsburgh on 24 – 25 September 2009, leaders stated that: 
Our commitment to fight non-cooperative jurisdictions has produced impressive 
results.  We are committed to maintain the momentum in dealing with tax 
havens... We stand ready to use countermeasures against tax havens from March 
2010.284 
By the time the OECD published its next white/grey/black list on 18 August 2010, all 
jurisdictions had committed to the OECD EOI standard.  13 states remain on the grey 
list, however these generally reflect developing countries with few resources that are 
nevertheless making progress in signing on to TIEAs.285 
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Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs) 
 
Before the G20 Washington Summit on 15 November 2008 a total of just 44 TIEAs had 
ever been signed.286   In the four months between the Washington Summit and the 
London Summit the OECD reports that TIEA and DTA signings skyrocketed, with 21 
new agreements completed.287  By the time the next G20 Summit was held in Pittsburgh 
in September the same year, an additional 164 agreements were in place.  Of the 38 
jurisdictions on the grey list, 36 had implemented enough agreements by the end of 
2009 to secure their removal, signing a staggering 200 TIEAs and 118 DTAs between 
them.   At the time of writing, TIEAs and DTAs continue to be rapidly established, with 
133 new TIEAs and 40 new DTAs between January 2010 and 18 August 2010.288   
 
Figure 1: OECD graph of TIEAs signed globally 289 
 
 
Figure 1 (above) dramatically illustrates the suddenness with which the TIEAs were 
signed.  It should be noted that this does not include an additional 158 new or 
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renegotiated DTAs updating the EOI article.  The reason these bilateral treaties were 
able to be signed so quickly is because a significant number had been pre-negotiated by 
tax havens (following the OECD’s adoption of TIEAs as its standard) as insurance 
against any future OECD blacklisting.  Therefore many states were able to rapidly 
respond by signing and giving effect to TIEAs that had been sitting dormant since as 
early as 2004.290   
 
In light of the universal commitment of states to TIEAs (and EOI in DTAs), combined 
with their endorsement by the UN in its Model Tax Convention, the OECD has 
proclaimed its model for EOI as an undisputed, global standard.291  However, the fact 
that most states were aware of the standard many years before they adjusted their 
behaviour, and the way in which so very few were prepared to sign on in the absence of 
overwhelming political pressure and the threat of imminent sanctions, suggests that 
states did not adopt TIEAs because of new international norms or a new standard of 
appropriateness.  Neither could it be said that they were attracted or induced by the soft 
power of the OECD or other member-states.  Rather, the evidence is clear that they 
were coerced. 
 
What motivated the G20’s dramatic action? 
With the crisis, global public opinion’s expectations are high, their tolerance of 
non-compliance is zero and we must deliver.292 
 
Mark Blyth’s studies of great historical transformations to the international system have 
revealed that in circumstances of institutional stability, state interests are likely to also 
be stable and consistent.  But in situations of instability, such as during a major 
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economic crisis, the way in which states conceptualise their interests changes 
drastically.293 
 
The collapse of global financial markets in the wake of the GFC brought massive 
instability to the international realm.  The ensuing recession in the major OECD states 
brought with it dual imperatives for governments to fund economic stimuli and social 
services while restraining spiraling budget deficits.  This environment restricted the 
ability of governments to significantly adjust tax rates or reduce public spending, so 
state interests were redefined under enormous pressure to find alternative sources of 
revenue.  Policing tax evasion offered a potentially significant alternative source of 
income for governments, but tax haven secrecy prevented them from pursuing offshore 
tax avoiders.   The way that the GFC affected nearly all OECD countries in this same 
manner caused the closer alignment of interests supporting decisive, collective action 
against tax havens.  
 
The collapse of financial markets brought about a structural change that presented tax 
havens as undermining both domestic revenue and international financial stability.  It 
further brought to light the way in which tax havens were used by the same financial 
institutions that required bail-out by public funds – public funds that their tax avoidance 
had diminished.  The GFC therefore brought about enormous political pressure to do 
something about tax havens and state interests were redefined in accordance with this 
new reality. 
 
To date there has been no new constructivist literature attempting to explain tax secrecy 
developments in the wake of the GFC.  However, constructivism would not consider the 
structural force of a global economic recession to be the fundamental cause of change.  
Rather, change to the status quo is explained as the result of interaction between states, 
redefining state identities and interests over time.294  It is these identities and interests 
that determine state actions in accordance with expectations of appropriate behaviour.295  
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The suddenness of the changes in state behaviour with respect to banking secrecy means 
that it would be difficult to explain them in terms of social discourse or global norms.  
There were clear, material factors that motivated OECD governments to reignite their 
dormant campaign against tax havens, and this time the economic and political stimuli 
were stronger than ever before.  This explains why the project achieved such rapid 
success and also why it had been unsuccessful previously.  In 2001, the Harmful Tax 
Competition campaign was overhauled in alignment with the shifting priorities of 
dominant OECD states.  In the years that followed, the structural environment did not 
provide sufficient motivation for serious pursuit of transparency and information 
exchange.  The GFC provided the necessary instability for a rapid reconception of state 
interests along with the broadness of a structural change that affected dominant OECD 
states in a universal way, causing their interests to collectively align.   
 
Sharman has stated that norms of multilateralism and non-intervention had regulated the 
OECD campaign in 2001 by ruling out the use of both coercive measures as 
illegitimate.296 He argued that expectations of appropriate behaviour are what stopped 
the OECD from continuing with its Harmful Tax Competition campaign because the 
OECD’s identity conflicted with the coercive nature of blacklisting.297  If this claim is 
accepted, it is difficult to see how the OECD identity and norms that dictate appropriate 
behaviour could have changed so dramatically in less than a decade, unless this is 
attributed to a sudden structural shift. 
 
Domestic budgets 
 
The GFC had an undeniable impact on governments’ balance sheets throughout the 
world and particularly on those of the United States and Europe.   Facing multi-billion 
dollar deficits at the same time as high unemployment and stagnant economies, 
governments were left with the unenviable task of making trade-offs between fiscal 
austerity, measures to boost economic growth and the increased demand for social 
                                                 
296
 Sharman, J.C. Havens in a Storm: The Struggle for Global Tax Regulation, (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2006), p 8. 
297
 Sharman, J.C. ‘International Organisations and the Implementation of New Financial Regulations by 
Blacklisting’, in Jutta Joachim, Bob Reinalda and Bertjan Verbeek (eds.), International Organisation and 
Implementation: Enforcers, Managers, Authorities? (Routledge: Hoboken, 2007), pp 48-61 and Sharman, 
J.C. Havens in a Storm: The Struggle for Global Tax Regulation, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006). 
 69
services.  The need for spending had increased at the same time that tax revenues had 
declined due to economic recession.  Facing such pressures, governments looked for 
ways both to increase their revenue and to reduce their expenditure.  
 
Raising tax rates was largely considered to be out of the question, both because this 
would inhibit economic recovery and because it was not politically viable at a time 
when many constituents were suffering.   The contrary was true of public spending, as it 
could assist with economic recovery and win support from voters, but with government 
deficits already stretched, extra funding was scarce.  A third option was to seek to 
attract economic stimulus in the form of capital investment from abroad. 298   This 
increased competition between states for limited capital and has led some governments 
to reduce corporate or savings tax rates even though this reduces their short-term 
revenue.  But ultimately, the ability of governments to compete with other countries for 
mobile capital is constrained by the domestic political economy.299 
 
As capital-exporting states, a significant proportion of the wealth of OECD members is 
invested offshore.   If its governments were unable to attract this wealth home through 
attractive tax rates, they could instead seek to ensure that they at least are taxing the 
proceeds.  The amount that could potentially be recovered in this manner is not 
insignificant.  The US Senate has estimated that the revenue it loses to tax havens 
amounts to 100 billion dollars a year and in many European countries the sums run into 
billions of euros.300  The estimated 18.5 billion pounds that the UK Treasury loses to tax 
havens each year is particularly pertinent when compared against its total 44 billion 
pound deficit.301  
 
The most significant barrier between OECD governments and the enormous potential 
revenue they could unlock by stopping offshore tax evasion is the banking secrecy laws 
of tax havens and their corresponding inability or refusal to provide information on their 
foreign tax residents.  The structural change of the GFC brought with it enormous 
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political and economic pressure to come out of recession as quickly as possible.  This 
redefined state interests so that revenue collection became a very high priority. A 
solution lay in the large source of potential tax revenue lost due to the use of tax havens 
and so a renewed and heightened campaign against tax haven secrecy was in the 
interests of OECD states. 
 
Tax havens as a contributory cause of the GFC 
 
Opacity, facilitated by banking secrecy, was at the heart of the GFC.  Because the level 
of risk associated with complex financial products was disguised, banks could no longer 
trust their peers’ structures and accounting disclosures.  This caused a breakdown in 
global banking systems and gave rise to the subsequent credit crunch.302 
 
Banking secrecy offered by tax havens can be used to hide anything from assets to 
liabilities to toxic debt.303  In the lead-up to the GFC, banking secrecy assisted in hiding 
the toxic debt levels of many complex financial products (such as special purpose 
vehicles, structured investment vehicles, collateralised debt obligations, private equity 
and hedge funds), thereby disguising their associated investment risk.304  Substantial 
levels of sub-prime debt originating from the US housing market are thought to have 
been repackaged and on-sold through tax havens such as the Cayman Islands and 
Jersey.305  So although tax havens were not the cause of the GFC, it would have been 
more difficult to disguise and pass on toxic debt without them.306 
 
Offshore subsidiaries were established in poorly-regulated tax havens to disguise the 
true ownership of financial vehicles.  A separate entity such as a trust or even a 
supposed charity would be used to isolate ownership from onshore parents and to secure 
higher credit ratings.  When the subsidiaries fell into default it was difficult to prove 
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their ties with the parent company, so losses and associated liability were contained 
within these legally separate units.  Therefore many that benefited from on-selling toxic 
debt instruments were protected from the fall-out.307   
 
The use of tax havens also enabled the exploitation of regulatory gaps across a number 
of jurisdictions.  Even if each haven had been properly regulated each jurisdiction only 
accepts responsibility for what happens in its domain. 308  This drew attention to the 
need for supranational regulation, because even if all OECD governments were able to 
pass laws to prevent a future crisis, if tax havens continued to apply different standards 
or to facilitate avoidance of new standards, the whole effort would be undermined.309  
So even though they were not completely to blame for the GFC, tax havens have 
increasingly come to be seen as a key part of its solution.310 
 
Tax havens provided an additional source of anger for the general populous affected by 
the ensuing recession because of the fact that governments were required to bail out 
failing financial institutions using taxpayer dollars, when those same financial 
institutions had employed tax havens to avoid contributing to such government funds.  
The irony of financial institutions taking from a source that they had effectively stolen 
from did not go unnoticed.   OECD Secretary-General Angel Gurria has expressed this 
sentiment succinctly:  
There’s a worldwide crisis, the worst that we’ve ever seen in our lifetimes. The 
level of tolerance of tax evasion and of your neighbour helping your citizens pay 
less taxes becomes absolutely intolerable.311 
 
The collapse of financial markets was the structural change that exposed tax havens as a 
threat to domestic economies and fuelled domestic political pressure to take action 
against them.  The interests of states at the centre of the GFC were therefore redefined 
in accordance with the new economic and political reality. 
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Why did the secrecy jurisdictions comply? 
For decades, states had applied domestic secrecy laws offering a competitive edge over 
traditional financial centres.  The advantages of these laws in attracting foreign capital 
rendered them highly successful and despite periodic condemnation from core states, 
they continued to function largely undisturbed.  Although the Harmful Tax Competition 
forced many to make commitments towards change, very few actually implemented any 
changes.  Further, when the campaign was scaled back in 2001, those that had made 
commitments with respect to their domestic tax systems were given the opportunity to 
back down.   
 
Against this backdrop, the changes made by tax havens over the past two years are 
unprecedented.  Not only did they commit to make changes, but they implemented their 
commitments by signing on to numerous bilateral EOI agreements at a phenomenal 
pace.  Ratification of the new TIEAs and DTAs requires that domestic laws are adapted 
in line with these commitments and therefore secrecy jurisdictions have had to overhaul 
their legislative codes to give effect to their agreements.  
 
The offshore financial centres have been vocal in expression of their reluctance to make 
these changes while G20 leaders have been almost candid in conveying the extreme 
pressure that they applied to them.   It cannot be disputed that the secrecy jurisdictions 
complied under enormous international pressure by way of blacklisting and an 
imminent threat of sanctions.312 
 
The change in behaviour of tax havens in swiftly agreeing to the EOI standard is 
difficult to explain from a constructivist perspective.  The coercive pressure applied to 
tax havens did not take the form of normative persuasion and any standard of 
appropriate behaviour that could be said to now exist certainly did not exist at the time 
when the key secrecy jurisdictions announced their compliance.  The new global 
standard for EOI came about as a result of key states succumbing to coercive threats 
                                                 
312
 Perez-Navarro, Grace. ‘The OECD is Working with Governments to Clamp Down on Tax Havens’, 05 
October 2009, on You Tube at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HrAOW1jAHrk&NR=1, accessed 
13/04/2010. 
 73
from other states – they did not comply because of an existing standard of appropriate 
behaviour.  Clear evidence of imminent material consequences for states that did not 
comply gives further weight to the conclusion that the havens acted on the basis of 
anticipated consequences rather than a logic of appropriateness.  
 
Blacklisting 
 
The material impact resulting from the blacklisting of tax havens by the OECD in 2000 
has been well documented. 313   States understood that the consequences of being 
blacklisted (for a second time in some cases) would cause significant damage to their 
economies.  It has been noted already that blacklisting negatively affects the risk 
assessments of both potential and existing investors – the higher the risk of resulting 
sanctions, the riskier the investment.  The secrecy jurisdictions anticipated that investors 
would withdraw in response to blacklisting and material economic loss would result.   
Havens responded to both imminent and actual blacklisting by seeking to prevent 
consequential damage.   
 
Although the material cost to their financial sectors through compliance was also likely 
to be high, tax havens were particularly vulnerable to blacklisting because they were 
themselves affected by the structural change of the GFC.  In the new international 
environment of the credit crunch, these states were already straining to retain scarce 
capital and maintain the confidence of their investors.  In the absence of any other 
substantial business activity, tax havens were highly dependent on this foreign 
investment as the basis of their economies.   
 
The previous experience of blacklisted tax havens had also illustrated that there could 
be long-term effects in the form of targeting by individual state governments and by the 
private sector.   Some states had fought for years to have their names removed from 
copycat lists and even full compliance did not guarantee removal.  These lists provided 
a basis for extra-scrutiny, compliance costs and outright boycotts of certain jurisdictions 
by investors. Once a state had been blacklisted, it could take years for the spotlight to 
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shift and for investors to begin to have confidence in its stability again.  Hence the 
potential long-term effects of blacklisting would have provided additional weight to the 
case for compliance.  
 
Sanctions 
 
In contrast to the blacklisting of states in 2000, this time the threat of sanctions was 
much more concrete.  No longer was it just the OECD that was talking about defensive 
measures – now the heads of state of all the world’s largest economies were jointly 
threatening them.  In addition, these governments had a highly visible, material cause to 
follow through with their threats – they had to balance their books in the face of deficits, 
economic decline and rising social costs.  G20 leaders had been frank about the need to 
protect their public finances in this structural environment,314 and there was more reason 
to believe them than ever before. 
 
The proposed sanctions were afforded much wider publicity with their inclusion in the 
G20 London Summit Declaration315  and their potentially very extensive nature was 
bound to have frightened both the governments of the havens and investors.  Even in the 
absence of a blacklist, the announcement of these intended measures would likely have 
caused investors to pull out of known tax havens and their governments to pre-
emptively comply.    
 
The future of banking secrecy and compliance  
It is not the case that tax haven abuse will stop in the near future. That is too 
much to hope for; and there are too many locations to tackle for this to be 
realistic. It does seem, however, that a tipping point has been reached. From 
their high point in 2002, when they appeared unassailable, tax havens have now 
reached a point of significant vulnerability, from which it appears they cannot, 
in the long term, recover.316  
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In light of the unprecedented changes that have occurred in the past 24 months, it is 
pertinent to consider to what extent these changes represent a permanent departure from 
the former status quo.  The OECD Secretary-General and leaders of the G20 have been 
quoted extensively in saying that banking secrecy for tax purposes is no more.  A new 
global standard has been established and the vast majority of states have already 
implemented it.  In addition a new institution, the Global Forum on Transparency and 
Exchange of Information, has been established to ensure that the EOI standard is 
adhered to. 
 
Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information 
 
The Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information was established by 
the OECD in September 2009 and this time it comes much closer in living up to its 
name.  While its predecessor, the Global Forum on Taxation, had just 32 member-states 
and a very low profile, the new Global Forum boasts 95 members including all offshore 
jurisdictions in addition to the G20 and OECD members.317  It has also gained the 
support of large developing economies such as Argentina, China, India, and South 
Africa. 318 
 
The new Global Forum was created for the purpose of “ensuring rapid and effective 
global implementation” of the EOI standard by monitoring progress and conducting 
peer reviews.319  It has a three-year mandate to peer review all members and any “other 
jurisdictions which may require special attention”, and to provide recommendations for 
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reviewed jurisdictions.320   The first set of peer reviews were launched on 1 March 
2010.321  Global Forum Chair Mike Rawstron has stated that:  
This is the most comprehensive, in-depth review on international tax 
cooperation ever… With these reviews we are putting international tax 
cooperation under a magnifying glass.322 
 
OECD Secretary-General Angel Gurria has explained that the Global Forum is a new 
institution intended to provide states with assurance of the cooperation of their peers.  It 
provides tax havens with “cross-security” so that in implementing costly changes to 
their banking secrecy regimes they can be sure that other states are not taking advantage.  
The Global Forum is intended to resolve the prisoner’s dilemma and implement a “level 
playing-field” for all states.  The reason for this security is that states know they are 
being monitored and if they do not comply they will be subjected to sanctions.323   
 
If Angel Gurria is to be believed, the Global Forum will be a model of neoliberal 
institutionalism.  It has come into existence with the intended goal of overcoming a 
collective goods dilemma through coordination of individual state action. Yet 
neoliberals would also point out that states can only be expected to continue to 
cooperate for as long as it remains within their own interests to do so.324 
 
It is uncertain whether it will remain in the interest of offshore financial centres to 
continue to participate in the Global Forum.  It required enormous pressure to tip the 
balance of tax havens’ interests in favour of compliance given the significant financial 
costs that information exchange will bring.  When these costs really start to bite, these 
states may rationally calculate that the greater cost is from continued compliance.  In 
addition, as the world economy recovers from recession, the impetus on G20 states to 
maintain the same level of pressure on havens could be expected to slacken.  Therefore 
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although the Global Forum will provide some assurance to states and will regulate the 
behaviour of its members in the short-term, its future is by no means certain.   
 
Will the TIEAs have any practical effect? 
 
Given that the new global standard for effective EOI has become the number of TIEAs 
(or DTAs containing EOI) that a state has signed, the effectiveness of these agreements 
will be very significant to the Global Forum’s success.  Given also that these 
agreements are so new, there is very little evidence on which to base an assessment.  So 
far, very few requests have been made under such agreements.  One of the most long-
standing TIEAs is between the US and Jersey, having been in force since 2001, yet 
there has been just five pieces of data exchanged in this time.325 Commentators point to 
the fact that requesting governments need to know a significant amount about a suspect 
to be able to request the right evidence from a foreign government, and given that states 
are able to maintain secrecy except in the case of specific requests, tax authorities 
simply don’t know what they don’t know.326   
 
There is thought to be a deterrent effect against tax evasion from the knowledge that 
information could be requested and provided to the home government, but it will most 
likely require some high-profile convictions to have any significant effect.327  
 
There is a growing demand for automatic information exchange between governments 
whereby all data on foreign income would automatically be sent to the taxpayer’s home 
jurisdiction.328  However, there is a high level of opposition to this proposal on the basis 
of the privacy laws of many states and the prohibitively high cost of administering such 
a scheme.   
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The nature of TIEAs as one-sided agreements could also be expected to have an impact 
on their effectiveness.  For obvious reasons, tax havens generally have no interest in 
requesting information from other states.  Therefore these agreements create a situation 
whereby small states bear all the expense of gathering and providing requested 
information for no compensation.329  Beyond the pressure created by the Global Forum, 
its peer reviews and the threat of sanctions, tax havens have no motivation to take their 
TIEAs seriously. 
 
Mock compliance 
 
Andrew Walters has theorised that governments may have incentives to visibly signal 
compliance with international standards, when in fact their underlying behaviour is 
inconsistent with compliance.  He has termed such behaviour as “mock compliance” 
and has applied his theory to the case study of East Asia’s adoption of financial 
standards following the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.330   Walters argues that mock 
compliance is most likely to occur where: 
1. Private sector compliance costs are relatively high; and 
2. The costs of outright compliance costs are relatively high; and  
3. Third party compliance monitoring costs are relatively high.331 
 
Walters’ framework for assessing the likelihood of mock compliance might indicate 
whether the new global EOI standard will be adhered to by tax havens.  
 
With respect to private sector compliance costs, Walters explains that where the 
adoption of international standards lowers the profitability of domestic firms, incentives 
to diverge will be strong.332  In the present case study, tax havens have few domestic 
firms.  However, the core business of those that do exist is generally the provision of 
offshore financial services.  To enable governments to provide effective EOI, these 
service providers will be required to establish records they may not have maintained 
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previously, such as the full details of entity and account ownership.  Although it is 
expected that such data will be rarely requested, full records will still be necessary in 
order to service these requests.  Given that most tax havens operate on small profit 
margins, often only attracting revenue in the form of one-off licensing fees, the cost of 
compliance with EOI standards could be proportionately high.  For small, developing 
states, these compliance costs are likely to be even more onerous.  
 
Walters describes outright compliance costs as consisting of both the internal costs of 
implementing new systems in accordance with the new standards as well as external 
costs in the form of market responses to the potential revelation of damaging 
information.333  With respect to internal costs of EOI, tax havens will be required to 
establish systems that will enable them to meet the requests of foreign governments in 
sufficient detail.  The cost to governments might not be as high as to the private sector 
because they would not need to hold data on all foreign entities and transactions – they 
would only need to be able to obtain this information from the private sector when 
requested.  However, the government’s role in regulating private sector compliance 
could be significant, especially for developing states with small public sectors and 
limited resources.  
 
External compliance costs faced by tax havens could be expected to be highest, as this 
includes both the loss of revenue from licensing fees or levies and the loss to the wider 
economy due to capital flight.  Without the guarantee of secrecy, tax avoiders will be 
less inclined to invest in tax havens as the tax savings they offer may be outweighed by 
the potential cost of being caught.  Many tax havens have no other significant domestic 
business activity beyond their offshore services industry and lack the means to compete 
in any other industry.  Therefore the external cost of EOI might be fatal for tax havens’ 
economies.   
 
The third factor in Walter’s framework contends that mock compliance will only be 
viable if all parties believe that compliance will be difficult and expensive to measure 
and punish.334  If compliance is assessed solely on the basis of the number of TIEAs in 
force, it would be easy and inexpensive to measure.  However, it would be unlikely to 
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provide a true assessment of the extent to which a state complies with EOI requests.  
The Global Forum has indicated that it will conduct comprehensive, in-depth reviews of 
all its members.335  This will, to a certain extent, rely on the full cooperation of the 
member-states.  It is also likely to take a significant period of time to assess all 95 
members.  There is no existing standard for punishment other than having less than 12 
TIEAs, so it is not clear how the Forum would address a lack of effective EOI found in 
spite of a state meeting the 12 TIEA requirement.  Given the uncertainty of each of 
these key variables, states may come to the conclusion that the Global Forum peer 
reviews will not be effective.  Once the first round of reviews has been completed, other 
states will be in a better position to form a view on the likely success of mock 
compliance.  
 
The costs to tax havens in substantively complying with the EOI standard, with respect 
to their private sectors, governments and levels of foreign investment, will no doubt be 
high.  Whether or not mock compliance is considered to be in a haven’s interests will 
therefore depend on its assessment of the likelihood of being caught.  If a haven is 
assessed by the Global Forum as failing to meet the EOI standard, this in itself may 
have a similar effect to blacklisting.  The haven may be censured by market forces 
because investors have shown little tolerance for the risk of dealing with named 
jurisdictions.  However, investors will only remain intolerant of this risk for as long as 
the threat of sanctions remains real. 
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CHAPTER 5: Conclusion 
This thesis has contributed an alternative explanation to the existing constructivist 
account of the OECD campaign against tax havens.  It has reinterpreted the OECD 
project through a neoliberal institutionalist lens and has offered a different take on each 
major historical development.  It has brought the story up to date, describing the events 
of the past two years and explaining the underlying causes in a manner consistent with 
the neoliberal reinterpretation.  It has finished by considering what this account might 
predict for the future of tax information exchange. 
 
The constructivist explanation for the beginning of the OECD campaign in 1998 has 
been contested.  The account of capital flight as a normative discourse overstates the 
extent to which states have been agents in the processes of globalisation.  While 
governments were responsible for specific policy changes in relation to trade 
liberalisation, subsequent technological developments gave rise to an exponential rate of 
irreversible transformative change.  This thesis has found that the OECD campaign 
began in the wake of the structural challenge of capital mobility.  OECD countries were 
unable to compete with the tax advantages offered tax havens because they were 
restricted by their domestic political economies.  They therefore had a collective interest 
in preventing tax havens from competing.  The OECD provided a solution to the 
collective goods problem in the form of an institutional environment that regulated state 
behaviour to prevent cheating.    
 
A neoliberal account has been provided for tax havens’ compliance in response to 
blacklisting.  The thesis has determined that tax havens responded to actual or 
anticipated consequences.  Blacklisting caused investors to reassess the level of risk 
associated with dealing with named tax havens because of the threat of sanctions.  Tax 
havens were coerced into compliance not because of damage to their reputations, but 
because blacklisting indicated imminent sanctions. 
 
The scaling-back of the OECD campaign in 2001 was found to have been caused by a 
change in US interests.  US interests were reassessed in light of both a change in 
economic circumstances and domestic political pressure from lobbyists.  Although the 
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lobbyists used normative arguments, they displayed a willingness to employ whatever 
norms would further their goal.  They targeted each audience with different norms that 
supported the pre-existing, objective interests of the group.  The US government was 
convinced to change its tact not because of the normative rhetoric of the lobbyists, but 
because the lobbyists demonstrated that it would harm US business interests if havens 
were abolished.  The OECD campaign also threatened US domestic policy of reducing 
tax rates.  Without the support of the world’s largest economy, the OECD would no 
longer have been able to regulate the prisoner’s dilemma, therefore it was forced to 
adapt to maintain US participation. 
 
Tax havens acted rationally and in accordance with their interests by lobbying through 
alternative institutions where their collective voice bore greater weight.  Their success 
in achieving the support of particular OECD states was the result of their close 
proximity to those states.  Australia and New Zealand have a vested interest in the 
stability and economic welfare of the Pacific and the economic damage to the region 
caused these states to determine that aspects of the OECD project went against their 
regional interests.  The close ties between Canada and the Caribbean, particularly with 
respect to economic development, leads to a similar conclusion.  The change in these 
states’ interests contributed to the OECD’s decision to adjust its project in line with new 
collective interests. 
 
The change to OECD rhetoric at this time has been explained in line with Nye’s soft 
power thesis.  Because institutions employ whichever norms are most useful in 
achieving the goals of its members, their rhetoric will shift in accordance with changes 
in collective interests, or changes in the interests of its dominant members.  
 
The OECD project stagnated between 2001 and 2008 because the collective interests of 
members did not dictate that secrecy be vigorously pursued.  Dominant OECD members 
were not prepared to challenge the strong opposition of Switzerland and the other 
leading secrecy jurisdictions because there was no imperative to do so.  Consequently, 
there was no real threat of sanctions and so tax havens had no motivation to sign on to 
TIEAs.  Despite the fact that a new OECD standard of information exchange was 
established during this time, the associated norms of transparency were not sufficient to 
change tax haven behaviour because their interests clearly favoured banking secrecy. 
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The OECD’s sudden success in 2008-09 has clearly illustrated that transformative 
change is only possible when the interests of powerful states align.  The structural effect 
of the GFC impacted the domestic political economies of G20 leaders providing them 
each with a fiscal imperative as well as a political imperative to be seen to do something.  
This rapid alignment of interests explains why G20 states applied such intense pressure 
to secrecy jurisdictions.  The havens responded once again, due to the anticipated 
consequences of investors responding to blacklisting as an indicator of imminent 
sanctions.  The fragility of tax haven economies meant that a loss of investor confidence, 
with or without accompanying sanctions, would have a severe impact on their interests.  
They were therefore left with no choice but to comply. 
 
The neoliberal perspective has provided insight into the likely future of tax information 
exchange.  The new Global Forum with its much broader membership provides greater 
assurance to states that their peers will not cheat.  However, this will only be true for as 
long as collective interests are maintained.  If the pressure on tax havens reduces as the 
world economy recovers, the cost of their compliance may outweigh the benefits.  
TIEAs might not be an effective assessment of true compliance with the EOI standard; 
therefore mock compliance can be expected if the chances of sanctions become remote.  
 
This case study has revealed that transformative change happens in accordance with 
state interests rather than with identities and norms.  International institutions 
fundamentally exist to advance the interests of their member-states and will adapt their 
goals to reflect changing collective interests.  States that are coerced to change their 
behaviour can be expected to comply only to the extent required to avoid sanctions. 
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